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Preface 
 
I believe in the huge potential of the UK economy. I see the ambition to succeed in businesses, 
social enterprises, and our public services. In schools, hospitals, and police forces, we have huge 
talent. Unlocking that talent is essential to securing our future success.  
Not only because public services are around a fifth of the economy, important though that is. 
More pressingly, doing so is necessary if we are to deliver the improvements in public services 
that taxpayers demand.  
We have made good progress over the past seven years, reducing the deficit while improving 
frontline services, but we can go much further. To do that, we will need to unleash a new era in 
public service provision by harnessing technology, creativity, and ideas. 
How do we go about doing that? Firstly, it is about measurement. If we can’t measure results, 
people will talk about what they always talk about: money.  We need to track how we turn 
public money into results for citizens. We need to understand the impact each pound spent has.  
And we need to prioritise to ensure that resources are allocated to where they will be most 
effective. 
Secondly, it is about leadership. We have great leaders across our public services.  Some of our 
most successful innovations – academies, foundation trusts, reform prisons – have involved 
enabling and empowering leaders.  We need to give our leaders the freedom to decide the best 
way to deliver results, and then effectively hold them to account for whether they have done so. 
Finally, it is about unlocking the ideas and creativity of our public sector and opening ourselves 
up to innovation. I do not believe the public sector should resist outside influence, or command 
and control from the centre.  We need to champion an open, vibrant, and creative culture 
where all ideas are welcome regardless of where they come from.  
All of this requires a new way of thinking – and a new relationship between the Treasury and 
departments. It means setting up the right structures to both protect public money and give our 
leaders the freedom to lead, encourage creativity and innovation whilst holding them to account 
for their performance.  
Sir Michael’s report provides hugely valuable insight into how to meet this challenge. It offers us 
a systematic way of understanding public sector results, and delivering the change that we 
need. If we can create a permanent culture of improvement and learning, then it will drive our 
economy, improve our services, and put our society in a strong position to thrive. 
 
 
Rt Hon Elizabeth Truss MP  
Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
17 November 2017 
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Foreword 
All over the world contemporary governments find themselves in a triple bind. Citizens demand 
ever higher performance from government and public services; taxpayers are unwilling to pay 
more, understandably so in an era when median incomes have been, at best, rising slowly; and 
the burden of debt following the financial crisis remains high, imposing a real, immediate cost in 
interest payments and a significant burden on the next generation, if not paid down.  
Under these intense pressures, how can governments succeed? The answer is, to borrow a 
phrase from the Prime Minister, Theresa May, to focus on ‘the good that government can do’.1 
What this requires, above all, is to get the best possible value from every tax pound government 
spends. In economic jargon that means enhancing the productivity of the public sector. 
The United Kingdom spends approximately £800 billion every year, around 40% of GDP. If 
government were able to maximise the ‘good’ this sum delivered, if public services were 
consistently of high quality, if markets were always effectively regulated, if opportunities for 
innovation were seized, if risks and threats were well-managed, then social mobility would be 
enhanced, opportunity would be opened up, the country as a whole would be more productive 
and many, many more people would lead more fulfilling and productive lives. And these gains 
could be delivered without raising or spending a single extra pound. In short, the potential prize 
for ordinary people from enhancing government productivity is huge.  
To maximise the ‘good’ that government can do in this way demands that government and 
public services demonstrate their productivity and set out systematically to improve these. This is 
no more than common sense. 
So what’s the problem? Firstly, measurement of public sector productivity has proved elusive, in 
spite of the sterling efforts of top economists, such as the late Sir Tony Atkinson, over recent 
decades. What is relatively straightforward in the private sector, where both cost and price are 
clear, is much harder in the public sector. To take just one example, the difference in quality 
between one teacher or nurse and the next is hard to quantify in money terms but is hugely 
significant for outcomes. 
Secondly, incentives in the public sector have traditionally been, to put it mildly, ambiguous. 
Ministers’ performance tends to be judged on the size of the budget they negotiate with the 
Treasury, rather than how much they deliver or innovate. Civil servants tend to get bigger 
rewards and more status for managing more people or bigger budgets. Departments don’t call 
time on budgets that aren’t delivering. They rarely, if ever, go to the Treasury with ideas for 
spending less, even if, through innovation, doing so could improve outcomes. Some years ago, 
when I volunteered to return, in mid-year, part of a budget I had realised I wouldn’t need, the 
relevant Treasury officials almost fell off their chairs in surprise – no-one ever did that, they 
commented.     
Meanwhile, beyond Whitehall, public sector workforces tend to advocate simultaneously both 
more spending and less accountability for outcomes, thus reinforcing these counterproductive 
tendencies. The media often also reinforces them by focusing on inputs – numbers of doctors, 
teachers or police, for example – rather than on what is being delivered for citizens. 
1Speech at Conservative Party Conference at the ICC Birmingham, October 2016 
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Moreover, the Treasury too has historically placed greater emphasis on inputs rather than 
outcomes. Of course, it is necessary and right that the Treasury should count the pennies -
someone has to - but that should surely not be its only focus, even in hard times. As Chapter 2 
makes clear, there have been a variety of attempts in the last forty years to broaden the focus 
beyond inputs but these have tended to be temporary and separate initiatives rather than 
irreversible changes in either the core processes or the culture.  
This review was commissioned precisely because Treasury ministers and officials, to their credit, 
recognised that this needs to change. It would be arrogant as well as inaccurate to suggest that 
this report solves these profound historic problems at a stroke. It does, though, propose clear 
practical steps in the required direction of travel. It suggests a new basis for dialogue between 
the Treasury and departments, one based on the outcomes being delivered as well as budget 
allocation. Without suggesting that the Treasury weakens its control on the inputs – on the 
contrary in fact – it also suggests a way of reviewing whether productivity (or public value) is 
being delivered and a means of benchmarking programmes, including those that cut across 
departmental boundaries, on their productivity.  
It suggests that, in the second decade of the 21st century, there should be no excuse for not 
having good data to enable effective monitoring of the outcomes programmes are delivering. It 
argues that continuous improvement – marginal gains, if you prefer – and disruptive innovation 
should not be optional extras but embedded in the way business gets done in Whitehall. Above 
all, it argues for a much stronger emphasis on outcomes, medium- and long-term, as well as 
inputs.   
These changes in turn would alter incentives – ones which reward more and better for less, 
rather than bigger budgets or more staff. In other words, the report makes the case for a 
change of culture as well as process across government and the public services, a change that if 
successful would affect ministers, officials and all those who work in the public sector. It would 
put the benefit to ordinary people’s lives and aspirations at the heart of policymaking and 
budgeting. 
Given the history, cynics will say that none of this will ever happen. Of course, if we concede to 
the cynics their view will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This review says we can do much 
better; it says, seize the moment to change course. It says cultures can and do change. It says 
that, in the consultations during the preparation of this report, we have found frustration with 
the current approach and, more tellingly, genuine enthusiasm for trying something new and 
radical and different. 
The next step, which is the least we owe it to citizens and taxpayers, is to grasp the opportunity 
provided by this new enthusiasm, to trial a new approach and thus seek to maximise ‘the good 
that government can do’. 
Sir Michael Barber 
17 November 2017 
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Executive summary 
Governments affect people’s lives every day: they tax, spend, regulate, supervise and, perhaps 
most importantly, deliver vital public services. World-class public services have a direct and 
lasting impact on people’s lives, be this making them healthier, safer, or better educated.  
Simply put, when governments deliver better services, people’s lives improve.  
Delivering world class public services involves turning public expenditure into outcomes that 
citizens value. Successive UK governments have focused on either controlling public expenditure 
or on delivering specific public service outcomes. They have had considerable success, and have 
innovated in ways admired around the world. However, they have rarely succeeded in doing 
both at the same time. The challenging fiscal position (highlighted most recently in the Office 
for Budget Responsibility’s Fiscal Risk Report)1 coupled with growing demand for better public 
services and the pressures of an ageing population mean that now, more than ever, the 
government needs to achieve both.  
Improving public sector productivity – doing more with less – is a key way to deliver this. 
However, doing so is notoriously difficult. 
The key challenge – highlighted in the academic literature – is one of measurement. While in the 
private sector measuring productivity is relatively straightforward (both inputs and outputs have 
a cost), this is frequently not the case in the public sector. A hospital might deliver a large 
number of medical appointments with the funding allocated to it, but if those appointments do 
not translate into improved health outcomes for patients then the service is not improving the 
lives of those it serves. A gallery or museum which has sound financial management and 
effective procurement procedures will not be maximising the value it delivers if it fails to educate 
or inspire its audiences and play a role in the local community. The methodological problem is 
both compounded and reinforced by the frequent lack of good quality, comparable data to 
enable analysis and performance tracking over time. 
In the absence of consistent output data and productivity metrics, the temptation has been to 
equate inputs with outputs: more funding equals a better service. As attractive as this 
assumption is, it cannot be sustained in practice. It can stifle innovation, encouraging greater 
focus on quantity over quality and less consideration of how additional funding is being used. It 
means the public debate all too often degenerates into a political impasse of ‘spending versus 
cuts’. And it has a negative impact on conversations within government. Though departments 
retain a clear responsibility to maximise the value of their spending, it remains the case – not just 
in the UK –  that larger budgets are equated with prestige and importance. In preparing to 
negotiate spending settlements, departments rarely propose cutting ineffective areas of 
spending, reducing baseline expenditure, or innovating to deliver more for less. The Treasury 
tends to reinforce such behaviour through its own ways of operating. 
Nonetheless, governments in the UK have made numerous attempts to address the public sector 
productivity challenge. These have made real progress: the work of the Prime Minister’s Delivery 
Unit in the early 2000s pushed the frontier of delivery methodology; following the Atkinson 
Review, the Office for National Statistics has become a world-leader in public sector productivity 
measurement methodology; and the Treasury’s current system of Spending Reviews and 
spending control framework is internationally recognised as world-leading. However, these 
1 ‘Fiscal Risk Report’, Office for Budget Responsibility, July 2017 (available at: http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/frr/fiscal-risk-report-july-2017/) 
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periodic reports, units and initiatives have taken place in the absence of an embedded strategy 
for continuously improving efficiency and productivity. These have often had a significant short-
term impact, but have generally lacked follow-through. They have not addressed the central 
challenge for both Whitehall and the wider public sector: how to change cultures and 
behaviours within government to do better in future.   
Tackling this challenge is the core focus of this review. It examines how to institute and embed 
continuous productivity measurement and improvement across the public sector. To achieve this 
the central recommendation of this report is to introduce a new Public Value Framework2, set 
out in the diagram below (a full version of the Framework is included in Appendix A): 
Chart 1.A: Public Value Framework 
The overall task is clear: optimising the process of turning funding (primarily but not exclusively 
government funding – represented by the floor) into policy outcomes for citizens (represented 
by the roof of the temple). Achieving this rests on the strength of the four Pillars. 
Pillar 1 focuses attention on the outcomes expected from a given budget over a 3- to 5-year 
time horizon, including the potential impact on human capital. 
Pillar 2 explores how well inputs are being managed.  As noted above, the UK has a 
considerable track record of success with each of Pillars 1 and 2 but has rarely managed to focus 
on both simultaneously. 
Pillar 3 highlights the need to convince taxpayers of the value being delivered by spending, and 
of the importance of engaging service users. There are many areas of public expenditure where 
the active engagement of the user of a service can make an enormous difference to improving 
outcomes, such as altering their lifestyle to improve their health. If this is neglected, then it can 
do much to frustrate the successful delivery of outcomes.  
2 See Annex B for glossary of terms
4
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Pillar 4 emphasises the long-term sustainability of the system and the importance of responsible 
stewardship. Those responsible for a service or institution need make sure that, as they make 
progress on Pillars 1, 2 and 3, they are also strengthening its capacity to deliver in the long term. 
Leaving an institution in better shape than one found it may not seem as immediate as the other 
Pillars, but is vital to delivering long-term public value. 
These pillars solely assess the process of turning funding into policy outcomes. They make no 
judgement on the amount of funding allocated. Nor do they speculate on what might be 
achieved with different levels of funding; they simply look at what was done and how money 
could be spent better. The Framework also seeks to avoid using observed outcomes to infer 
judgements on the health of the process. A programme could be outperforming its outcome 
targets but still have scope to be more productive; just as a highly productive programme could 
fall short of its performance targets. 
For the Framework to be effective at changing cultures it needs to be integrated into the 
ongoing conversations and processes around public expenditure, both between the Treasury 
and departments and within departments themselves. Regular assessments to the Framework – 
or Public Value Reviews – will be key to achieving this. These could be undertaken on large 
budgets, either within individual departments or across departmental boundaries. They should 
be collaborative, involving joint teams drawn from the relevant departments, the Treasury and 
other experts, and establish a shared evidence base from which judgements can be made (on a 
4-point scale) about progress within each Pillar and actions to improve performance. The 
reviews also need to be appropriately incentivised with sufficient accountability to ensure the 
agreed actions are delivered. The experience should be sharp, focused and rapid, initiating a 
fresh rhythm of practical, constructive conversations about maximising public value. 
The benefits of this approach are numerous. The Framework will be a practical tool for assessing 
the chances that public value is being maximised. It will give the Treasury a new structure and 
dialogue for engaging with departments, shifting attention from solely focusing on inputs 
towards optimising the chances of maximising public value. The reviews will not simply be a 
Treasury tick box exercise forced on departments by their spending teams.  They will strengthen 
ongoing conversations by creating a shared evidence base from which to jointly diagnose 
challenges and agree solutions. Over time, the knowledge acquired within the Treasury through 
repeated assessments across a range of services will allow better identification of opportunities 
for such collaboration, particularly on cross-cutting issues such as improving mental health 
outcomes or managing the criminal justice system. This should also improve learning and 
understanding across government of best practice and how to deliver more for less.   
To enhance the effectiveness of the Framework some basic building blocks need to be in place. 
This review therefore makes further recommendations to support its delivery and encourage 
better dialogue between the Treasury and departments.   
First, for every major area of public expenditure it should be customary that good data is 
gathered and analysed in a timely manner to allow informed decisions to be made by those 
responsible for blocks of expenditure. In the second decade of the 21st century there is no excuse 
for not having this data available, both to departments and the centre of government. Where 
possible, this data should also be open, accessible, and comprehensible to the public, consistent 
with the government’s commitment at the last election. The report therefore recommends that 
government raises the profile of existing data initiatives across government, and that the 
Treasury acts as a catalyst for this by demanding transparent, better quality, more consistent, 
and more timely data from departments.  
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Second, the report recommends that public bodies should be consistently using this data to 
deliver marginal performance gains at no extra cost to the taxpayer. For example, any good data 
system should allow benchmarking to compare the performance of different units within a 
system. Those responsible for schools, hospitals and so on should be routinely challenged to 
compare themselves to the top performers in their sector. The Treasury and departments should 
apply this pressure to identify and seize marginal gains, from which service users will benefit.  
Third, alongside marginal gains, increasing productivity also requires disruptive innovation: 
radically new ways of doing things that deliver much better outcomes for reduced costs. In 
recent years, the government has encouraged this through numerous innovation funds, some of 
which have resulted in bold and valuable ventures. However, the drawback of such funds is the 
risk of characterising innovation as an optional extra, separate from the business-as-usual 
operation of the department. The next step is to encourage departments and agencies to 
develop radical innovations that both improve outcomes and reduce costs across their whole 
organisation, and the Treasury has a role in encouraging this.  
Many of the recommendations of the report have been developed through extensive 
consultation with Permanent Secretaries, relevant sections of the Cabinet Office and other 
departments across Whitehall. These have been positive and constructive, with widespread 
recognition of the challenges and enthusiasm for the proposed solutions. However, the 
solutions proposed here are by no means the finished product. The next step should be to pilot 
the Framework collaboratively with some departments and agencies in the first half of 2018. 
This will provide a practical opportunity to test the approach and refine as necessary. Many 
departments have already expressed interest in being involved in these pilots.  
Improving public sector productivity is key to meeting the twin challenges of controlling public 
expenditure and meeting growing demand for high quality public services. There is a unique 
opportunity now to implement a tool for measuring, tracking and delivering these 
improvements while permanently embedding a new dialogue around public expenditure. 
Treasury ministers and officials are open to altering the way they operate and collaborate; the 
Cabinet Office and the Treasury have a strong, collaborative relationship on efficiency to build 
from; and Permanent Secretaries are ready to work with the Treasury to maximise the public 
value they deliver. If this opportunity is taken there is every reason to believe that Britain can lead 
the world in controlling expenditure while delivering world-class public services, and significantly 
improve the lives of its citizens in the process. 
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1 
Why is public sector 
productivity important? 
“…it is the mark of a chicken-hearted Chancellor when he shrinks from upholding economy 
in detail, when because it is a question of only two or three thousand pounds, he says it is 
no matter. He is ridiculed, no doubt, for what is called candle-ends and cheese-parings, 
but he is not worth his salt if he is not ready to save what are meant by candle-ends and 
cheese-parings in the cause of the country.”1 
William Ewart Gladstone (1879) 
1.1 Ever since Gladstone’s 1866 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act established the position 
of Comptroller and Auditor General to approve the government’s allocations and audit its 
accounts, successive Chancellors have sought to maximise what is delivered from public 
spending. While perhaps not all have gone to the lengths advocated by Gladstone, delivering 
more for less has been a core Treasury interest for well over a century. So why is it so important? 
1.2 The economic benefits of productivity are well understood. Productivity underpins economic 
growth: the more output produced per unit of input, the more there is to consume. Higher 
productivity typically supports real wage growth (thereby raising household incomes) and is the 
single most important determinant of average living standards. UK productivity has increased 
more than eight-fold over the past 100 years, expanding the range of goods and services people 
can enjoy and ensuring they have more money in their pocket to access them. In short, higher 
productivity improves people’s lives. 
1.3 Public sector productivity is important for two reasons. First, the public sector is a significant 
component of the UK economy. In the period since the Second World War, public spending has, 
on average, been roughly 40% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 The public sector employs 5.4 
million people and constitutes around 17% of the workforce.3 Public sector productivity is 
therefore a key component of overall UK productivity. Second, higher productivity is central to 
maximising what people get from their government. Most people directly interact with the 
government in two ways: they pay taxes and they consume services. If asked what they prefer 
from these interactions, most people would probably state lower taxes and better services. Since 
the government uses tax receipts to fund the bulk of public services, the only sustainable way to 
deliver both these outcomes and avoid accruing crippling debts is to improve productivity. 
1.4 As highlighted by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in their Fiscal Risks Report, the 
fiscal challenges over the coming Parliament are likely to remain significant.4 The government 
has made good progress in reducing the deficit (from 9.9% in 2009-10 to 2.3% in 2016-17); 
however, the fiscal position remains tight. Public sector borrowing for 2017-18 is forecast to 
remain at 2.9% of GDP while public sector net debt is set to peak at nearly 88.8% of GDP. At 
the same time expectations from and demand for public services are increasing. The UK is 
becoming more populous and, on average, older, thereby increasing the strain on services. The 
only way to successfully and sustainably manage these pressures is to improve public sector 
1 ‘Speech in Edinburgh, 29 November, 1879’, as quoted in ‘Gladstone as Financier and Economist’, F.W. Hirst, 1931
2 ‘Public finances databank’, OBR, October 2017 (available at: http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/data/)
3 ‘Summary of labour market statistics’, ONS, September 2017, (available at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/datasets/summaryoflabourmarketstatistics) 
4 ‘Fiscal Risks Report’, OBR, July 2017 (available at: http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/July_2017_Fiscal_risks.pdf)
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productivity. This can’t be achieved by either borrowing to pour money into public services, or 
cutting services altogether. It can only be achieved by closely examining what is spent, where it 
is spent, why it is being spent, how it is spent, and above all, what value it generates. 
Box 1.A: Consistent definitions 
Clear and consistent use of terms will be essential in fostering an ongoing, constructive 
dialogue across the public sector around efficiency, productivity, outputs, outcomes and 
public value. This report aims to set an example: Annex B contains a glossary of terms.  
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2 
Has the government not 
looked at this before? 
2.1 If the Treasury has had such a long-standing interest in improving public sector productivity, 
it is reasonable to ask why it has not come up with a system to do so. The answer is, in part, it 
has. It allocates budgets across departments at Spending Reviews, sets the spending rules for 
departments to follow, maintains in-year spending control, and publishes and upholds 
standards around value for money and spending appraisals. By extension, it has the ability to 
allocate resource away from unproductive and inefficient areas of spend, set spending rules that 
reward efficient departments and penalise those who fail to deliver value for money. At which 
point it is reasonable to ask: why are we looking at this question again? 
2.2 While the Treasury does have levers to influence public spending, in practice there are often 
constraints on using them.  Certain public services for instance will continue to require funding 
regardless of how productively or efficiently they operate. And given the fiscal challenge outlined 
in Chapter 1, now is a good time to explore whether there is more the Treasury can do. Before 
doing so, however, it seems sensible to look at how previous governments have tackled this 
issue.  
Recent history 
2.3 Many of the antecedents of the current efficiency landscape can be traced to the early 1980s 
and the work of Sir Derek Rayner. In 1979 Rayner was asked by the then Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher to head an Efficiency Unit to investigate waste in the public sector. Rayner’s 
unit undertook ‘scrutinies’ into public sector processes and made recommendations for 
improving their efficiency. With the direct interest and support of the Prime Minister, Rayner was 
able to investigate a broad array of areas ranging from the regulation of radio frequencies 
(Home Office), procurement of non-warlike stores (Ministry of Defence), and the Treasury’s own 
typing pool. Although following Rayner’s departure in 1983 the National Audit Office (NAO) 
contested the savings Rayner’s team had delivered (estimating that of the £421 million in 
savings identified by 1983, only £171 million had actually been achieved), they accepted that 
the scrutiny process had helped to improve efficiency within government.1 
2.4 The Efficiency Unit continued its work through the rest of the 1980s. By the end of the 
decade though, the focus had shifted towards delivery as the key to efficiency improvements. 
The Next Steps report in 1987 was central to this shift in focus, arguing for agencies to be 
created with a sole focus on implementation (the report set a target of turning 75% of 
Whitehall into executive agencies by 1994).2 As smaller, more agile entities, it was assumed 
these new agencies would be able to pioneer good management and better use of resources. 
These conclusions were supported by the then Cabinet Secretary and Sir Peter Kemp – another 
Permanent Secretary – was tasked with implementing the recommendations.  
1 ‘Reforming the Civil Service: The Efficiency Unit in the early 1980s and the 1987 Next Steps Report’, Institute for Government, 18 May 2012 (available
at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Efficiency%20Unit%20and%20Next%20Steps.pdf) 
2 ‘The Next Steps Initiative’, Institute for Government, 1987 (available at: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/case%20study%20next%20steps.pdf) 
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2.5 Implementation was impressive: by 1997 78% of civil servants worked in agencies.3 This 
contributed to some significant performance improvements: for example, when the UK Passport 
Agency was created in 1991 the average time taken to produce a passport was over three 
months. By 2002 this had fallen to ten days.4 There remains a debate over how effective the 
changes were, but the experience undoubtedly demonstrated two points: structural 
reorganisation of the civil service was possible; and the support of senior officials and ministers 
was critical to achieving this progress.5 
2.6 The election of the New Labour Government in 1997 provided the catalyst for the next 
evolution in thinking about public sector productivity. The Blair Government was elected with a 
clear mandate to invest in public services: between 1996 to 1997 and 2000 to 2001, total 
government expenditure rose nearly 16.7% in nominal terms.6 In part to agree with departments 
what they would deliver for this extra funding, the Comprehensive Spending Review in 1998 
introduced the concept of Public Service Agreements (PSAs).  
2.7 PSAs contained detailed delivery targets for each department and metrics by which success 
would be judged. The system was supported by a change to the Spending Review process, 
whereby spending was allocated for a three-year period but reviews conducted every two years. 
This meant that each Spending Review refined the last year of the previous review and allocated 
funding for the further two. These innovations provided a major step towards both transparency 
and accountability for what was being delivered. It also allowed for regular opportunities to 
reallocate resources accordingly.7 
2.8 PSAs took time to fully embed within the system. Early iterations included too many targets, 
some of which were poorly designed and others unmeasurable. These were refined through 
successive Spending Reviews, and began to gather momentum with the creation of the Prime 
Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) in 2001. The PMDU was created to support delivery of the 
public service reform agenda on which the government had been re-elected. It highlighted a 
subset of key PSAs (in education, health, transport, and home affairs) and focused relentlessly 
on ensuring government delivered against them. The routines of the PMDU brought together 
senior figures from across government in regular stocktakes chaired by the Prime Minister, 
providing an opportunity for a factual discussion in which problems or challenges could be 
resolved and practical next steps agreed.  
2.9 There were no material sanctions for failing to deliver on targets but, as with Rayner’s 
‘scrutinies’, the Prime Minister’s presence proved a powerful impetus for ministers and officials 
to focus their efforts. This approach was complemented by the NAO’s report in 2001 on 
Choosing the Right FABRIC8 (produced jointly with HM Treasury, the Office for National 
Statistics, the Audit Commission and the Cabinet Office), which stressed the importance of an 
3 ‘Better government services: Executive agencies in the 21st century’, HM Government, July 2002 (available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135335/http://www.number-10.gov.uk/files/PDF/opsr-agenciesm.pdf)  
4 ‘Public service productivity estimates: total public service, UK: 2014’, ONS, 2015 (available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/publicservicesproductivity/articles/publicservicesproductivityestimatestotalpublicservic
es/2014) 
5 ‘The Next Steps Initiative,’ Institute for Government, 1987 (available at: 
(https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/case%20study%20next%20steps.pdf)  
6 ‘Public finances databank’, OBR, 11th October 2017 (available at: http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/data/)
7 ‘Public Service Agreements and the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit,’ Institute for Government, 2006 (available at: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/case%20study%20psas.pdf)  
8 ‘Choosing the Right FABRIC’, National Audit Office; Audit Commission; HM Treasury; Office for National Statistics, 2001 (available at: 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/choosing-the-right-fabric-3/)  
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agreed performance assessment framework and the benefits of high-quality targets to shift 
focus towards both desired results and the processes necessary to deliver them.9 
2.10 Over the course of the government’s second term, the combination of PSAs and the PMDU 
delivered tangible results. By July 2005 the targets on burglary, car crime, railway punctuality 
and reducing cancer mortality were all on track, while those for A&E waiting times and routine 
operations had been achieved.10  
2.11 Nonetheless the government did not escape criticism. Ministers were accused of devoting 
too much time and attention to delivering outcomes and too little time to controlling inputs: of 
throwing money at targets rather than focusing on whether that money was being well-spent. 
This criticism was not totally unfounded: ONS data shows public service productivity in 2005 
was 2% lower than it had been in 2001.11 
2.12 Partly in response to these criticisms, the government commissioned two reviews towards 
the end of its second term. The first – an independent review of public sector efficiency 
undertaken by Sir Peter Gershon – was published alongside the 2004 Spending Review.12 This 
identified £20 billion of efficiency savings across government and made a series of 
recommendations for efficiency improvements. These included improving financial management 
(specifically mandating that all departments appoint a professional finance director with a seat 
on the departmental board), better cross-departmental working, and rewarding key individuals 
for helping to embed continuous efficiency improvements. Many of Gershon’s recommendations 
were adopted and, while the NAO again disputed the total savings, the report continues to be 
seen as highly influential.13 
2.13 The second review was released in January 2005 and examined the measurement of 
government output, input, and productivity.14 Led by Sir Tony Atkinson and supported by a team 
drawn from the Treasury, ONS and Department of Health, the report concluded that the ONS 
had been right to move towards direct measurement of public service outputs, but that several 
defects in implementation ought to be addressed with an explicit framework. Critically, Atkinson 
argued that such output measures should be quality adjusted.15 This was pioneering, and 
prompted a re-evaluation of how efficiency was conceived by official bodies. Building on these 
insights the ONS became an international leader in the developing field of measuring public 
sector productivity, a position that it continues to occupy today. 
2.14 If the attention had been on outcomes under Blair and Brown, the financial crisis in 2008 
brought controlling inputs sharply back into focus. In the subsequent two years, the deficit grew 
to nearly 10% and following the 2010 election, a new coalition government took office with a 
specific mandate to deliver a budget surplus by 2015. With the economy slowly emerging from 
recession and tax receipts suppressed, delivering this commitment required reducing the rate of 
public spending growth. A Spending Review was launched in 2010 to identify spending 
reductions across all unprotected areas of spend (protected areas included health, school 
education, international development and defence), alongside which the Treasury imposed 
9 ‘Memorandum by the Government (PST 60)’, select committee on Public Administration, May 2003 (available at: 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmpubadm/62-x/3032406.htm) 
10 ‘Instruction to Deliver: Fighting to Transform Britain’s Public Services’, Michael Barber, 2007
11‘Public service productivity estimates: total public service, UK: 2014’, ONS, 2015 (available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/publicservicesproductivity/articles/publicservicesproductivityestimatestotalpublicservic
es/2014) 
12 ‘Releasing resources to the front line’, Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency, Sir Peter Gershon, July 2004 (available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/C/A/efficiency_review120704.pdf)  
13 ‘The Efficiency Programme: A Second Review of Progress’, NAO, February 2007, HC 156 (available at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2007/02/0607156i.pdf)  
14 ‘The Atkinson Review: final report. Measurement of government output and productivity for the national accounts’, Anthony B. Atkinson, 2005
15 Quality adjustment is used in the public sector because outputs are adjusted for quality in the absence of consumer prices
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spending controls to manage expenditure and ensure departments remained within their 
allocated budgets. The challenge for the government was to reduce spending without 
damaging economic performance, something which it has generally been recognised as having 
successfully achieved.16 
Recent efficiency initiatives 
2.15 The focus since 2010 on reducing the deficit while maintaining public service quality has 
led to renewed emphasis on public sector efficiency and a proliferation of activity looking at 
achieving more with less. 
2.16 The coalition government signalled its intent in this direction in 2010 by appointing Sir 
Philip Green to lead a review into government procurement and property management. The 
review concluded that the government often failed to leverage its reputation, brand, and credit 
rating when engaging in commercial transactions. Inconsistent commercial skills across 
government and no centralised procurement office also meant there was an enormous disparity 
in the prices departments were paying for similar products and services.  
2.17 The report recommended mandating centralised procurement for common categories of 
spend to leverage the government’s buying power and deliver better value for money.17 This led 
to the creation in 2014 of the Crown Commercial Service (CCS), a trading fund sponsored by the 
Cabinet Office with responsibility for procuring common goods and services on behalf of 
departments. 
2.18 Green’s report also informed the work of the Cabinet Office’s Efficiency and Reform Group 
and the creation of the Cabinet Office functional agenda. This was designed to create consistent 
standards and generate efficiencies within common functions (such as property, commercial and 
digital). This work generated some notable successes. The Government Property Unit (GPU) has 
helped to reduce estate costs by over £1 billion and overseen the collection of over £3 billion of 
capital receipts since 2010.18 GOV.UK, implemented by the Government Digital Service (GDS), 
has created a single point of access for government services and made it easier for citizens to 
find out what is happening within government. The creation of the Infrastructure and Projects 
Authority (a merger of Infrastructure UK and the Major Projects Authority) has brought together 
project management expertise within government to strengthen delivery capability within major 
projects. The functions are now embedded in the public spending landscape and are integral to 
identifying and delivering cross-departmental savings. 
2.19 In 2015 the Cabinet Office and the Treasury introduced Single Departmental Plans (SDPs). 
These were designed to articulate departmental performance objectives, encourage 
prioritisation, provide clear accountability and improve the way government monitors 
performance. Since their introduction, departments have been encouraged to reflect the activity 
they are undertaking to promote efficiency savings and use the planning process to understand 
the options available to deliver savings. The public summary of SDPs allows the public to track 
progress against key outcomes.  
2.20 Within finance, the Treasury has sought to improve professional capability and ensure 
finance is integrated into departmental decision-making. This process started in 2013 with its 
report on Strengthening financial management capability in government, which looked at the 
16 Speaking in 2015, the head of the IMF Christine Lagarde stated “it's obvious that what's happening in the UK [with regard to the government’s
economic strategy] has actually worked”. (available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32346214 (accessed 6 September 2017))  
17 ‘Efficiency Review by Sir Philip Green: Key Findings and Recommendations’, 2010 (available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61014/sirphilipgreenreview.pdf) 
18 ‘State of the estate report: 2015 to 2016’. Cabinet Office, February 2017 (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-of-the-
estate-report-2015-to-2016)  
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evolution of the Treasury’s role in spending control against the backdrop of increasing 
accountability for how taxpayers’ money is spent.19 In response to its recommendations the 
government launched the Financial Management Review (FMR) programme. ‘Value Maps’, 
jointly commissioned by the heads of government finance and the Government Economic 
Service (GES), were part of this programme. These were visual summaries of departmental 
spending, divided into logically defined spending areas and rated according to how well the 
department understood how this money was spent and the prospects for efficiencies. They were 
then discussed in peer review panel sessions with colleagues from across government. The 
process was praised by the Institute for Government (IfG) and the Chartered Institute of 
Management Accountants (CIMA), both of which recognised how the exercise had encouraged 
better joint working across government (due to the joint commission) and within departments 
(through joint working between finance, economist, and policy professionals).20 
2.21 The cross-departmental Public Sector Efficiency Group (PSEG), convened by the GES to 
inform the 2015 Spending Review, has also provided valuable insights on the trends and drivers 
in efficiency and recommendations for improvements. The group continues to meet regularly 
with departments, academics, local governments, and the private sector and is a valuable forum 
for sharing intelligence and best practice. Their five drivers of efficiency have become influential 
in identifying prospective savings and informing policy development. Examples of their five 
drivers in practice are provided in Box 2.A. 
Box 2.A: Drivers of efficiency in practice 
Markets and competition 
Birmingham City Council’s Step Down programme was launched in November 2014, with 
the purpose of increasing the stability of fostering. The service delivery is funded using a 
Social Impact Bond issued by Bridges Venture, a social capital investment fund which 
receives payment from Birmingham City Council if a placement remains stable after 52 
weeks. The contract only pays the service provider once outcomes are achieved, rather than 
for the provision of services. Birmingham City Council report £880,000 savings during the 
programme’s first two years (verified by independent evaluation by Oxford University).21 
Alongside these savings, 70% of the placements made to date remain stable and the 
majority of participants feel more secure. Average school attendance was higher than a 
baseline of foster children in residential care, and reduced levels of self-harm alongside 
improved behaviour was also recorded.  
Service redesign and alternative delivery mechanisms 
Leeds City Council’s Care Record programme, rolled out city-wide by the end of 2015, was 
set up to collect patient information held by the city’s health and social care providers in a 
single integrated database, and to ensure the most up-to-date information is available to 
NHS and social care professionals.  
19 ‘Strengthening financial management capability in government’, HM Treasury, 2013 (available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strengthening-financial-management-capability-in-government)  
20 ‘Getting to the heart of decision making’, Institute for Government, December 2016 (available at: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG_FMR_Cima_briefing_paper_WEB_2.pdf)  
21 ‘Evaluation of Birmingham City Council’s Step Down Programme: Report of the Preliminary Findings January 2017’, Gilian Plumridge and Judy Sebba, 
January 2017 (available at: http://reescentre.education.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/StepDownBirmingham_Prelim-
Findings_ReesCentreApr2017.pdf)  
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Box 2.B: Drivers of efficiency in practice (Continued) 
The medical information collected by NHS Trusts, GPs and Leeds City Council Adult Social 
Care providers is entered into a single, unified electronic integrated care record that health 
and social care professionals can access easily. The Care Record streamlines the information 
sharing process, allowing care professionals across the Leeds region to view the most current 
information for each patient and has helped to eliminate divisions between care settings. 
The programme led to estimated savings of £912,000 in 2015 to 2016.22 
Organisation and workforce 
Hampshire Constabulary’s Forensic Innovation Centre23 opened in 2015 to address the 
shortage of digital forensic skills in the police through drawing on expertise from the 
academic sector. Demands for digital forensics have created backlogs in cases that are 
frequently between 9 and 12 months long, but can sometimes reach up to 18 months. The 
Constabulary has collaborated with Portsmouth University to develop the Forensic Innovation 
Centre through which it provides its digital forensic services, gaining a purpose-built 
infrastructure where they can relocate their day to day business, as well as access to an 
academic partnership which brings new opportunities for innovation. 
Technology and targeting 
Newham Council’s Data Warehouse and Business Intelligence Programme has assimilated 
key data from over 20 separate systems to produce single records for people and properties. 
The data warehouse holds linked records from council and external systems, which enables 
better predictive analysis and business intelligence. Children’s services data, for instance, 
showed a growing number of level 2 and 3 referrals into the triage system with no clear 
reason as to why this is happening. Data scientists were able to use the data to identify the 
characteristics of children needing triage and who was referring them. This analysis led to a 
change in the allocation of funding towards early intervention programmes to target the 
children at risk of level 2 and 3 referrals. This has led to a reduction in looked-after children 
of 19% and a reduction of children in need of 17% while achieving a £500,000 saving. 
2.22 Alongside government-wide reviews, there have been numerous investigations into specific 
sectors. The Carter Review of 2015,24 for instance, examined productivity and efficiency in 
English non-specialist acute hospitals. The review found significant cost variation across the NHS 
and estimated tackling this would save up to £5 billion per year. It is not possible to summarise 
all the further reviews here, however similar investigations have been conducted into areas as 
diverse as criminal justice and higher education.   
Summary 
2.23 Two themes emerge from this brief examination of efficiency initiatives and their outcomes 
over the past four decades. The first is that genuine progress has been made. The work of the 
PMDU pushed the frontier of delivery methodology, breaking down the old stereotype of 
governments pulling on the levers of power and nothing happening. The current system of 
Spending Reviews and spending control is internationally recognised as world-leading. This 
progress has been made through evolution: the ideas behind the PMDU can be found in part in 
22 available at: http://www.leedsth.nhs.uk/a-z-of-services/leeds-care-record/
23 available at: http://www.port.ac.uk/institute-of-criminal-justice-studies/research/strategic-projects/forensic-innovation-centre/
24 ‘Productivity in NHS hospitals’, Department of Health, February 2016 (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/productivity-in-nhs-
hospitals)  
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both the Next Steps5 report (the focus on delivery) and Derek Rayner’s Efficiency Unit (the system 
of ‘scrutinies’); the focus on financial capability within the Financial Management Review 
programme picks up many themes identified by Gershon in 2004. These are positives that 
should not be ignored. 
2.24 The second – and the challenge for both the Treasury and departments in future – is the 
absence to date of any embedded strategy for continuously improving efficiency and 
productivity. As we have seen there have been numerous, often very influential, reports and 
units aiming to deliver improvements. However, in the absence of a coherent overall framework 
for improved efficiency and productivity, these have all too often been separate episodes that 
have lacked follow through and fallen short of fulfilling their potential. Nowhere is it set out 
what a public sector body needs to be doing as part of its core business, day-to-day, to improve 
its efficiency and productivity. It should be possible to define what needs to be done by 
combining a focus on simultaneously delivering outcomes and managing inputs, and 
embedding both in daily practice around Whitehall. This is the challenge to which the rest of 
this report is addressed. 
Box 2.C: Other ways the government seeks to promote value for money 
National Audit Office (NAO): The NAO is independent of government and is responsible for 
exploring the value for money (VFM) of government spending and informing parliamentary 
scrutiny through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Every year the NAO develops a two-
year forward programme of potential VFM studies, around three quarters of which are 
examined by the PAC after publication. Around 60 VFM reports are conducted every year, on 
topics agreed with departments. While short and crowded PAC sessions are not always 
conducive to in-depth scrutiny, the overall process is critical for ensuring accounting officers 
are held accountable to Parliament for their department’s performance and can help to 
prompt improvements. 
Managing Public Money:25 MPM sets out the main principles for dealing with resources in UK 
public sector organisations. It explains how to handle public funds with probity and in the 
public interest. While much of what the document prescribes is sound financial 
management, it also contains some specific rules and conventions about how certain 
activities should be performed. These range from the fiduciary duties of those handling 
public resources, to the need for the public sector to work transparently with Parliament. In 
outlining its invariable principles of transparency, integrity and value for money, the 
publication explicitly states that public services should account for their stewardship of public 
resources ‘in ways appropriate to their duties and context and conducive to efficiency’. 
The Green Book:26 This is the Treasury’s technical guidance on providing evidence-based 
decision support information for optimum use of public resources. It applies to policies, 
programmes and projects and is based upon the principles and methods of microeconomics, 
public accounting and statistics. It provides the Treasury with an objective basis for the 
comparison of spending proposals.  
25 ‘Managing public money’, HM Treasury, May 2012 (available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454191/Managing_Public_Money_AA_v2_-jan15.pdf)  
26 ‘The Green Book: appraisal and evaluation in central government’, HM Treasury, April 2013, (available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220541/green_book_complete.pdf) 
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Box 2.D: Other ways the government seeks to promote value for money (continued) 
The Green Book is widely referred to outside Government and is highly regarded 
internationally by public finance professionals and academics. It is also seen as a gold 
standard for the appraisal of public spending by international organisations such as the 
World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is supported by the Magenta Book, which sets out the 
recommended central government guidance on evaluation. 
Consolidated Budgeting Guidance:27 The Consolidated Budgeting Guidance sets out the rules 
to be followed in the management of departmental budgets. At the heart of this are the 
fixed annual spending limits, set at Spending Reviews, that departments are not allowed to 
exceed. Savings generated through efficiencies in one area may be recycled in-year and used 
to increase spending on other priority areas. The CBG also offers departments flexibility to 
move forecast underspends into the following year, to remove any incentive to take a 
wasteful ‘use it or lose it’ approach to spending. 
27 ‘Consolidated budgeting guidance 2016 to 2017, HM Treasury, 25 February 2016 (available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/503365/Consolidated_budgeting_guidance_2016-17.pdf) 
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3 
What can we learn from 
the academic community? 
3.1 It is not just within government that the challenge of improving public sector efficiency and 
productivity has attracted attention. It has been a major theme in the academic community as 
well. Since the literature on the subject is extensive, this chapter does not seek to be 
comprehensive. Instead, it highlights the themes in the literature which are most clearly relevant 
to this Review.  
Methodology 
3.2 The central difficulty in improving public sector productivity is measuring it. In the private 
sector inputs cost money and outputs typically raise it. Profit is therefore a proxy for productivity 
and firms are incentivised to maximise profits to maximise shareholder value. This kind of data 
allows precise metrics such as output per worker hour to be calculated. Profitable firms, with 
high productivity, tend to attract investment, providing the opportunity to grow and generate 
further profits. This creates a virtuous circle of economic good. Unprofitable firms by contrast 
get locked in a vicious cycle that eventually leads to insolvency. Raising productivity is therefore 
key to long-term business survival (or so the theory goes). 
3.3 The situation is different for public services. It is theoretically still possible to quantify inputs.  
The ONS publishes regular statistics on total public expenditure; the Treasury publishes the 
Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA); departments, agencies, local authorities, NHS 
Trusts and other similar bodies publish annual accounts which are then amalgamated into the 
annual Whole of Government Accounts (WGA). These show how much is spent and by whom.   
3.4 The challenge is in quantifying what is generated in return for this money. Many public 
services are not market goods (and deliberately so), and therefore lack a commensurate scale on 
which to measure output, a problem compounded by the significant potential variation in the 
quality of outputs. Quantifying the difference between lessons taught by teachers of different 
levels of competence, or the quality of care provided by different doctors, is an infinitely complex 
task. 
3.5 Faced with such a daunting assignment, it is a testament to human perseverance that so 
many have tried. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ONS are world-leaders in this space.  
They publish a time series of public service productivity back to 1997, based on methodology 
pioneered following the Atkinson Review in 2005.1 
3.6 More recently, in February 2017 the IfG and the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) published their inaugural Performance Tracker, designed to assess the 
performance of public services in the context of the government’s ambition to simultaneously 
maintain service quality and control spending.2 The tracker initially examined five key policy areas 
– hospitals, adult social care, schools, policy and prisons – and shows that from 2010 the
government was initially successful at enhancing the performance of services while either cutting
or controlling expenditure. The report flagged the challenges of maintaining this, however, with
1 ‘Public service productivity estimates: total public service, UK: 2014’, ONS, 2014 (available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/publicservicesproductivity/articles/publicservicesproductivityestimatestotalpublicservic
es/2014) 
2‘Performance Tracker: a data driven analysis of the performance of government’, Institute for Government, 2017 (available at: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/performance-tracker-spring-2017)  
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several of their indicators showing growing pressure on services. These conclusions were 
reiterated in the second edition of the Tracker, published in October 2017 and expanded to 
include a broader range of services, including Local Neighbourhood and UK Visas and 
Immigration.  
3.7 In April 2017, the McKinsey Centre for Government published an international study of 
public sector productivity across seven sectors in 42 countries.3 Countries’ success at converting 
inputs into outputs across these sectors are benchmarked against each other. While some of the 
outcome metrics used by the report deployed are familiar, such as Healthy Life Expectancy as a 
measure of health outcomes, in other sectors, such as public order, McKinsey developed 
complex composite metrics.  
Box 3.A: Quantifying the impact of public services on human capital 
Another strand of work has sought to explore the value of public services by assessing their 
impact on the value of human capital. As the OECD points out, the value of investing in 
human capital brings returns to the nation in the simplest terms by raising higher tax 
revenues from skilled individuals with higher qualifications or training.4 In 2015 an individual 
with a degree had an average human capital stock value of £628,000, compared with a 
person with no qualifications at £274,000.3 In addition to this, public expenditure can be 
reduced by investing in human capital. Individuals with low skills or levels of education are 
more likely to be unemployed and face social exclusion, which in turn cause increased 
problems through issues such as poor health and increased crime, which then require public 
expenditure to tackle. 
3.8 These three examples of the efforts to quantify public sector outputs and devise productivity 
metrics, together illustrate an important point. Due largely to its complexity, there is no single 
agreed methodology for measuring productivity. This is problematic in its own right, however it 
additionally means methodologies can be vulnerable to being subverted to show particular 
trends. This is something noted by Christopher Hood and Ruth Dixon in A Government that 
Worked Better and Cost Less?.5 Hood and Dixon evaluate public sector reform in the UK 
between 1980 and 2010 to assess the impact on service quality and public expenditure. They 
note how governments over that period have frequently altered the measures of government 
performance, such that data breaks regularly inhibit any attempt to assess performance over 
time and prevent reliable comparison of the performance of different governments. 
3.9 The methodological challenge is perhaps best illustrated by how few countries devote public 
resource to estimating their whole public sector productivity. At the time of writing there are 
seven: the UK, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, South Africa, Denmark, and Portugal.6 
Most other countries simply assume that public sector outputs are equal to inputs, meaning the 
only way to improve public services is to inject more money into the system. This assumption is 
often shared by commentators in the public debate too: in the absence of any other 
information, the only observable cause of public sector output is input. 
3 ‘The opportunity in government productivity’, Mckinsey & Company, April 2017 (available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-
insights/the-opportunity-in-government-productivity) 
4 ‘Human Capital Estimates 2015’, ONS, 2016 (available at:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/articles/humancapitalestimates/2015)  
5 ‘A Government that Worked Better and Cost Less? Evaluating Three Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government’, Christopher Hood &
Ruth Dixon, 2015  
6 ‘Challenges in the Measurement of Public Sector Productivity in OECD Countries’, Edwin Lau et al, 2017
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3.10 Unfortunately, attractive as such a world might be in theory it is not the one we live in.  
Money provided at one end of the system flows through a chain of complex interactions to 
create outcomes for citizens at the other: the chain has to be observed as a whole before it can 
be effectively optimised. This is also a point stressed by Hood and Dixon, who point out that in 
pursuing headcount reductions between 1980 and 2010 (ostensibly to reduce costs), successive 
governments were distracted from focusing on reducing other costs such as IT contracts, 
consultants, and advertising. Over the period civil servant numbers were cut by a third but 
overall running costs continued to rise.7  
Data 
3.11 The second theme from the literature relates to the availability and quality of data. Any 
analysis is necessarily going to be bound by the constraints of the source data; without this, no 
inferences or conclusions can be drawn. Picking up on the theme in Hood and Dixon, the IfG 
argues that embedding efficiency in the public sector can only be enabled through good quality, 
comparable data that allows for both the analysis and tracking of performance over time. 
Noting that both the NAO and PAC have highlighted the absence of a consistent planning and 
performance framework over time, they argue for the development of a performance-tracking 
mechanism that would allow best practice to be identified.8   
3.12 This is far from a forlorn hope: the example of Mitch Daniels provides a clear illustration of 
what can be achieved given the right circumstances. Upon taking office as Governor of Indiana 
in 2005, Daniels ensured that budget allocations for state departments and agencies were linked 
to their willingness to establish data systems that would allow for progress on outcomes to be 
monitored. Analysis of this data and subsequent actions led to significant service improvements, 
such that by 2012 the average waiting time for a driver’s licence was under nine minutes (down 
from over 40 minutes).9 Meanwhile by controlling costs, Daniels left office after two terms with 
the state in healthy surplus, in spite of the financial crisis which had adversely affected revenues.  
3.13 Equally important is transparency and the open availability of data, as argued for by the 
inventor of the World Wide Web, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, and many others. There are numerous 
examples of the benefits of open data. For example, in the US, Steve Ballmer (former Microsoft 
CEO) has sponsored USAFacts, which collates and displays the US government’s revenue, 
expenditure, and metrics data.10 Spending is grouped into four ‘missions’ derived from the US 
Constitution: (1) establishing justice and ensuring domestic tranquillity; (2) provide for the 
common defense; (3) promoting the general welfare; and (4) securing the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity. Relying exclusively on publicly-available government data sources, it 
presents this information simply, intuitively, and freely, making taxation, spending, and 
outcomes transparent and comprehensible for citizens. Closer to home freely available public 
transport data from Transport for London has been used to come up with innovative ways of 
analysing and presenting travel information. This has fostered the growth of tech companies 
such as Citymapper, launched in 2011 and now a global company providing services in 39 cities. 
Budgeting 
3.14 The third theme emerging from the literature is the importance of budgeting. One of the 
first actions Mitch Daniels took in Indiana was to establish a new Central Budget Office and give 
7 ‘A Government that Worked Better and Cost Less? Evaluating Three Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government’, Christopher Hood &
Ruth Dixon, 2015 
8 ‘Performance Tracker: A data-driven analysis of the performance of government,’ Institute for Government: 2017 (available at: 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Performance%20Tracker%20final%20web.pdf.)  
9 ‘How to Run a Government: So that Citizens Benefit and Taxpayers Don’t Go Crazy’, Michael Barber, 2016
10 available at: https://www.usafacts.org/ 
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its leader a place in the Cabinet. The importance of good budgeting is picked up by Peter 
Hutchinson and David Osborne’s The Price of Government: Getting the Results We Need in an 
Age of Permanent Fiscal Crisis. They advocate a ‘backwards’ approach to budgeting: rather than 
deciding how much to spend and then allocating it, they argue that governments should look 
first at what outcomes they want to deliver.11 With those established, and prioritised, they can 
then allocate spending in line with what citizens are prepared to pay. They structure this process 
around what they describe as five challenges for government: 
1 Get a grip on the fiscal problem: looking at the problem in what they describe as a 
‘clear-headed’ way. Is it about income, borrowing, or spending, or a combination 
of all three? 
2 Set the price of government: how much in total would the government like to 
spend and how much are the citizens willing to pay? 
3 Set the priorities of government: among the many possible priorities, where should 
the government focus its energy and investment? 
4 Allocate available resources across the priorities: at this point, hard choices have to 
be made because the overall total has already been set. The priorities guide the 
choices, but that doesn’t make the choices easy. 
5 Develop a purchasing plan for each result: this is the most radical part of the 
model. Once the allocations are decided, instead of simply passing the funding on 
to the relevant existing services, Osborne and Hutchinson propose the development 
of a purchasing plan by a Results Team for each priority area. This could involve 
quite radical reform. The Results Teams then produce a Delivery Plan for each major 
outcome. Because the assumptions of the status quo have been directly challenged, 
the result can be an outbreak of creativity.10 
3.15 Such an approach is very similar to the UK Spending Review process. It focuses attention 
on priority outcomes, and then works backwards to allocate the resources necessary to deliver 
these in the most effective and efficient way. Within the UK, however, the degree of creativity at 
step 5 has often been limited. 
3.16 The budget setting process is only one half of the story. The other half is the incentives and 
accountability within the system, and whether they encourage productivity and efficiency 
improvements. As outlined above, private sector firms are incentivised to create the virtuous 
circle and avoid the vicious circle. These incentives do not exist in the same way in the public 
sector. In most jurisdictions, a manager or minister gains status according to how large his or 
her budget is. 
3.17 These traditional incentives run directly counter to what Osborne and Hutchinson advocate 
and what efficiency demands: deciding priorities, allocating available resources, and then 
working to deliver in the most efficient way. Similarly, the absence of good data and metrics 
makes it difficult to hold managers accountable for their efficiency or productivity performance.  
Even where under performance can be demonstrated, it is not always possible to simply stop 
providing a service. This is particularly the case for those services that the government knows it 
must provide, come what may: health, education, defence and so on. The result is that there are 
few incentives for stopping unproductive and inefficient programmes and reallocating resources 
towards productive and efficient ones. Indeed, it is not uncommon for public servants to argue 
that poor performance is a justification for spending even more. Whenever this argument is 
11 ‘The Price of Government: Getting the Results We Need in an Age of Permanent Fiscal Crisis’, David Osborne and Peter Hutchinson, 2006
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accepted, perverse consequences are inevitable and any hope of an efficiency culture 
undermined.  
Balanced Scorecard 
3.18 Nonetheless there is hope. One important section of the academic literature suggests that 
we might be looking at the problem in the wrong way. To continue the private sector analogy, 
while a company’s profits will tell you its performance last year, they give you no indication of its 
performance next year. Many factors determine the overall health of a business: leadership, 
workforce, financial management capabilities, strategic vision, the popularity of its products, 
and so on.   
3.19 Many businesses and analysts use the ‘balanced scorecard’ developed by Robert S. Kaplan 
and David Norton to survey a range of factors as indicators of future performance.12 They 
suggest analysing customer perspectives, internal processes, organisational capacity, and 
financial metrics to assess a firm’s true performance. The public sector is in a similar position. It 
too is interested in future performance; past performance is useful only to the extent to which it 
can inform future improvements. The balanced scorecard approach does not necessarily involve 
quantifying outputs and inputs along a commensurate scale. It should therefore be possible to 
apply many of the principles of the private sector approach to the public sector and indeed 
many public sector organisations have attempted to do so.  
3.20 One of the luminaries in the field of improving public sector outcomes is Mark Moore, a 
professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Building on this kind of thinking, 
Moore is perhaps best known for defining ‘public value’ in his 1995 book Creating Public 
Value.13 One of Moore’s central points is that while private executives benefit from comparatively 
tight remits and easily measurable objectives, public sector executives often do not. He illustrates 
this point through the figure of a town librarian whose library is swarmed with children from the 
local primary school between the hours of 3pm and 5pm. After initially being concerned that 
their presence is a distraction from her official duties, she comes to regard looking after them as 
an exercise in providing fulfilment to the children. In doing so the town librarian ends up 
providing two public services – library services and informal childcare – with the same inputs, 
thereby increasing the public value of the library and the impact of the service on users.14 
3.21 Moore builds on this idea in his later book Recognising Public Value,15 to describe how 
public managers can translate the idea of public value into a tangible system of managing 
resources for better outcomes. He develops a ‘strategic triangle’ to show that public value is 
created when a given strategy or action has democratic legitimacy (e.g. the community supports 
it), the support of the authorising environment (e.g. a governing board), and when the 
government has the operational capacity to implement the strategy or action effectively. At the 
centre of Moore’s approach is what he calls the ‘public value account’. Use of collectively owned 
assets and financial costs are shown on the left, with items that go toward achieving valuable 
outcomes on the right. Moore develops similar accounts for the other two corners of the 
strategic triangle which, when all combined together, produce a ‘public value scorecard’. In 
Moore’s thinking, public value is maximised when: 
• outcomes are clearly defined and being delivered;
12 ‘The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action', Robert S. Kaplan, David Norton, 1996
13 ‘Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government’, Mark Moore, 1995
14 Ibid, Moore, 1995 
15  ‘Recognising Public Value’, Mark Moore, 2013
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• the resources allocated to it are being used efficiently in pursuit of the authorised
goals;
• the beneficiaries of the service and the citizens/taxpayers perceive it to be effective
and run broadly in accordance with society’s values; and
• the institution or service concerned is well-managed, resilient and capable of
delivering in the long-run as well as in the short-run.
3.22 The idea of public value has not escaped criticism. Rhodes and Wanna argue that Moore’s 
approach has the effect of elevating public managers to become ‘Platonic Guardians’ of the 
public good, providing intellectual and rhetorical cover for the encroachment of civil servants 
into territory properly occupied by elected representatives.16 Others have criticised the lack of 
specificity around the term itself, believing it is used to denote so many different practices within 
public management to be rendered meaningless. 
3.23 Nevertheless, Moore’s work has become increasingly influential. For example, the Boston 
Consulting Group’s not-for-profit arm, the Centre for Public Impact (CPI), has shown how it can 
shape policy-making. CPI’s publication, Public Impact Fundamentals,17 suggests policy-makers 
can enhance the chances of success by examining the themes of legitimacy, policy and action 
before proceeding, then periodically reviewing them as they proceed. Previous governments 
have also explored how it might be applied to UK public sector reform.18  
3.24 Furthermore, Moore’s criteria listed above provides a theoretical framework which can be 
developed into a fuller account of what needs to be done to deliver public value. This idea was 
picked up in How to Run a Government,19 which suggested governments could undertake 
periodic ‘productivity reviews’ based on Moore’s four criteria. It was argued that such a 
framework could fill the void identified in the previous chapter, helping public managers, 
officials, and government ministers to systematically think through what it takes to maximise 
public value. It could also offer a means of overcoming the disconnect between political ideals 
and reality by guiding the translation of policy into outcomes. 
3.25 This examination of the literature, and the review of government experience in the previous 
chapter, provide the foundation for what follows in the rest of this report. The next chapter 
makes the case for a Public Value Framework. This would provide a comprehensive and practical 
means of ensuring that departments and agencies think systematically about inputs, outputs, 
and outcomes, both short and long-term, as they manage their budgets. More importantly, the 
Framework would provide a platform to radically alter the public spending dialogue between the 
departments and agencies and the Treasury.  
16 ‘The Limits to Public Value, or Rescuing Responsible Government from the Platonic Guardians’, Rhodes and Wanna, 2007
17  ‘The Public Impact Fundamentals’, BCG Centre for Public Impact, 2016 (available at: 
https://publicimpact.blob.core.windows.net/production/2016/10/CPI-FUNDAMENTALS-REPORT.pdf)   
18 ‘Creating Public Value: An analytical framework for public service reform’, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 2002 
19 ‘How to run a government: So that citizens benefit and taxpayers don’t go crazy’, Michael Barber, 2016
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4 
Introducing the Public 
Value Framework 
Introduction 
4.1 The Framework establishes a set of relevant criteria that, if fulfilled, would mean the chances 
of optimal public value being delivered from a particular area of spending were maximised. 
Public bodies would then be able to assess their performance against these criteria, thereby 
identifying where they can make improvements to the value they deliver.  
4.2 There is nothing conceptually complex about the Framework. Rather, its intention is to 
provide a thorough list of questions organised systematically, to ensure that those responsible 
for spending public money do so with a better understanding of how to maximise its impact. As 
Atul Gawande argues in The Checklist Manifesto, such checklists are often highly effective in 
improving performance and avoiding error by minimising the risk of important steps being 
missed or loopholes left in analysis.1 
Evolution of the Public Value Framework 
4.3 The Framework published in this report builds on the work of Mark Moore, described in the 
previous chapter, and Chapter 8 of How to Run a Government.2 It has been developed through 
consultation and testing across Whitehall. This has refined the concept and ensured it is 
practical. It has been tailored specifically for use across the UK public sector.  
4.4 The version published here is by no means the ‘final’ version. Chapter 7 sets out the next 
steps more fully. It is anticipated that the Framework will need further refinement through 
voluntary piloting with departments prior to being adopted more widely in 2018. 
4.5 If ultimately adopted, the Framework would have two major practical applications: 
• It would form the basis for the ongoing dialogue across the public sector on public
value, thereby creating a common language on how to improve it. This includes
dialogue between the Treasury and spending departments (both at ministerial and
official level) and within departments. Since the same Framework would be used
across all areas of spending, it will increasingly enable benchmarking, and therefore
learning, across areas of expenditure which are quite different in nature. Defence
could learn from health and vice versa; and both could learn from work and
pensions and transport, for example. Similarly, the Framework could be used within
government departments to compare the public value generated by different
programmes across the department. This new dialogue should enable improved
learning about, and management of, the growing array of cross-departmental
issues which often form the major challenges any modern government faces (such
as countering extremism, tackling mental health or protecting the environment).
• It would form the agenda for periodic Public Value Reviews through which the
Treasury, in collaboration with departments, would examine in depth major areas
of public expenditure. These could be within or across departmental boundaries,
and/or where complexity and challenge are substantial and there is significant
1 ‘The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right’, Atul Gawande, 2009
2 ‘How to Run a Government: So that Citizens Benefit and Taxpayers Don’t Go Crazy’, Michael Barber, 2016
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potential for public value improvement. Chapter 5 describes how such a formal 
review might be undertaken. The key would be for them to be simultaneously deep 
and rapid, so that review teams can get to the root of the issues and apply any 
lessons learned as soon as possible. As the outcomes of these reviews accumulate, 
they should provide an unrivalled source of knowledge on how to improve 
outcomes while controlling costs. 
Overview of the Public Value Framework 
4.6 The chart below sets out an overview of the Public Value Framework. The overall task is clear 
– to turn total funding (the foot of the temple) into outcomes that citizens want (the roof).
Optimising performance within each of the four pillars strengthens the process of spending
money and improves the chances of maximising public value.
Chart 4.A: Public Value Framework 
4.7 The Reviews will make judgements on a department’s progress within each pillar using a 
four-point scale (shown on the bottom right of the chart). Finally, a combined judgement, again 
on the four-point scale, can be reached on the extent to which overall public value is being 
delivered. The chart below shows how judgements on the four areas can be combined to reach 
an overall judgement. 
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Chart 4.B: Framework assessment 
4.8 These judgements will provide a broad overview. However, the real value of the Framework 
will lie in going deeper. To enable sound judgements and help uncover practical insights, the 
four pillars are broken down into 16 further ‘areas to consider’. These are set out in the chart 
below. 
Chart 4.C: Areas to consider 
Four Pillars 16 areas to consider
1. Pursuing Goals
i. Understanding goals and indicators
ii. Degree of ambition
iii. Progress towards indicators and goals
3. Engaging Users and Citizens
i. Public and taxpayer legitimacy
ii. User/client experience and participation
iii. Key stakeholder engagement
4. Developing System Capacity
i. Capacity to innovate and learn from innovation
ii. Capacity to plan and deliver
iii. Capacity to engage with the delivery chain
iv. Capacity to work across organisational boundaries
v. Capacity of the workforce
vi. Capacity to review performance data and evaluate
impact
2. Managing Inputs
i. Processes to manage resources
ii. Quality of data and forecasts
iii. Benchmarking and cost control
iv. Cost shifting
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4.9 Each of these ‘areas’ are then broken down further into specific points, each of which 
prompts questions that can be explored by the review team. The Framework sets out best-case 
and worst-case scenarios for each point. With this precision and granularity, the Framework 
should uncover any lack of clarity or consistency in the approach being taken and identify clear 
steps to resolve problems. 
Box 4.A: Department of Health 
Some departments are already pursuing approaches that are similar to the Public Value 
Framework. For example, the Department of Health has used public value principles to 
support the Secretary of State for Health to achieve his ambition of making the NHS the 
safest healthcare system in the world. In 2013, England became the first country to 
introduce the Ofsted system to healthcare, giving independent ratings to every hospital, care 
home and GP surgery; while one of the five key domains in the new Care Quality 
Commission inspection regime is safety. The impact of this greater focus on safety is 
illustrated by an increasingly open reporting culture and should lead to reductions in 
measurable harm over time. It is also reflected in specific indicators such as the ‘safety 
thermometer’ data,3 where estimates show 86,000 fewer patients have suffered harm, while 
incidence rates in the four key harms have fallen from 7.2% of patients in 2013 to 5.8% in 
2016. The Department recognises there is still more to do in this area and published the 
draft Health Service Safety Investigations Bill in September 2017 for consultation. This would 
establish for the first time a fully independent investigations body responsible for 
investigating complex or systemic errors in healthcare, and recommending new practices for 
the NHS to embed. 
Rationale for each element of the Framework 
The Base: Funding 
4.10 Public spending in the UK currently totals approximately £800 billion per annum, including 
funding for the wide range of services that citizens expect – from defence and security to health, 
education, and benefits.4 The decision on how much to spend in total each year depends on a 
range of macro-economic factors, such as prospects for growth in the economy, the size of the 
deficit, interest rates, and degrees of risk in the global and British economies. This entire report is 
about how to maximise the chances of delivering the best possible outcomes for the money 
government spends each year on behalf of taxpayers. 
4.11 Responsibility for these vital decisions rests squarely with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Treasury itself. It is their task not just to set the 
overall total expenditure envelope but also to assess the numerous, often plausible, pressures 
from spending departments for additions to the total. Nothing in this report suggests any 
loosening in the way public expenditure is controlled: maintaining a tight grip on public 
expenditure is fundamental to Britain’s economic prospects, and the existing UK spending rules 
are internationally recognised as world-leading.  
4.12 Once funding allocations are made at a Spending Review, the department’s basic tasks 
become two-fold: first, to ensure it spends no more than the amount allocated; and second, to 
ensure the money is spent for the purposes intended in pursuit of the desired outcomes.  
3 ‘Safety Thermometer’, NHS Improvement, launched in 2013 (available at: http://www.safetythermometer.nhs.uk/) 
4 ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’, Office for Budget Responsibility, 2017 (available at: http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/efo/economic-fiscal-outlook-
march-2017/)  
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The Roof: Outcomes 
4.13 While successive British governments have experimented with how best to specify the 
outcomes intended from public expenditure, the underlying requirement to publicly justify how 
much is spent and what it is intended to deliver endures. This means they need to define (to use 
the jargon) ‘what success will look like’; or in non-jargon terms, how the money spent will 
improve people’s lives. 
4.14 This holds true across all public expenditure. It is reasonable to conclude that if there is no 
compelling answer to this question, then the case for spending the money is doubtful. In such 
cases a government’s credibility is usually fatally undermined.5 
4.15 Outcomes are not just about delivering short-term targets. Decisions about how to spend 
money should be made in ways that are legitimate and acceptable with the rule of law: this is a 
vital element of democratic government. The institutions that deliver services – the military, the 
NHS or Highways England, for example – should be run efficiently and well, building long-term 
capability and resilience such that they are passed on to future governments in better shape 
than that in which they were found. This is stewardship, an often neglected but nevertheless 
fundamental function of public governance and management. 
4.16 These elements of public value explain why there are four pillars in the temple, not just one 
or two. Each of these pillars are explored further below. 
Pillar 1: Pursuing Goals 
4.17 As noted above, for any chunk of public expenditure it should be clear what improvements 
to people’s lives that money is intended to deliver. Pillar 1 breaks this theme down in to three 
‘areas to consider’. 
Understanding goals and indicators 
4.18 This tests the degree of understanding that exists in relation to the goals or intended 
outcomes from the expenditure in question, and how progress will be tracked. Without this 
understanding, successful pursuit of goals is unlikely.  
4.19 The Framework tests this by looking for outcome-focused and measurable goals and a 
clear understanding of the improvements to people’s lives they are intended to deliver. It also 
looks for a grasp of historical data and the impact of past activities along with Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) to track and manage progress. Evidence for this area could be provided by a 
department’s SDP, and supplemented, where necessary, by internal performance management 
systems. Departments should also understand the links between KPIs, goals, and outcomes. 
Degree of ambition 
4.20 This area explores the ambition of the goals in question. An appropriate degree of 
ambition is vital for achieving goals and maximising public value. Goals that are either ‘wildly 
ambitious’ or ‘lacking ambition’ are both questioned by the Framework, although the possibility 
of setting ‘impossible goals’ is accommodated. Many great achievements fall into this category 
(perhaps most famously President John F. Kennedy’s promise in 1961 to put a man on the moon 
by the end of the 1960s). 
4.21 Ambition is a function of numerous factors, including the extent of organisational change, 
and the political, technical, or other constraints it might face. It is important to understand how 
5 As noted in ‘Managing Public Money’, HM Treasury, 2017 (available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454191/Managing_Public_Money_AA_v2_-jan15.pdf) 
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the degree of ambition meets the aspirations and needs of the system and citizens, and how 
challenging the goals might be to achieve when compared with appropriate benchmarks. 
4.22 The Framework requires public bodies to provide evidence of the ambition of their goals 
(potentially with reference to global best practice in similar sectors). It also requires them to 
effectively manage organisational change along the delivery chain. It assesses whether public 
bodies have the strategies in place to manage interdependencies with other programmes, are 
working to generate the necessary support from other public bodies to achieve the required 
output, and are monitoring the constraints – timescales, resources, technical, political – that 
may make the target particularly difficult to achieve, in order that they might adapt accordingly. 
Progress towards indicators and goals 
4.23 The final area looks at how progress towards goals is tracked and what that data shows. 
Successful delivery depends on a nuanced understanding of historical performance and future 
trajectories, and requires good data and performance analysis to identify whether further action 
needs to be taken.  
4.24 This is examined by looking at the extent to which bodies understand their historical 
performance, and whether delivering a given goal requires an incremental improvement or a 
step-change in performance. The Framework asks for evidence of recent performance and 
effective measures for assessing progress, as well as regular reviews of those measures to 
determine their continued suitability. It also requires evidence of information on trajectories, 
including the expected outturn at each point between the baseline and target year, and systems 
capable of breaking down data for comparison, where appropriate.  
Pillar 2: Managing Inputs 
4.25 The second pillar of the Public Value Framework covers what might be described as the 
Treasury’s traditional core business. Any credible finance ministry needs to be effective in 
checking that money is being spent in the right quantities in the right ways at the right time in 
pursuit of agreed goals. Departments ought to have the necessary processes in place to track 
this expenditure effectively. This Pillar is likely to require the least innovation within departments 
or the Treasury, since both have been interacting on this well-trodden landscape for decades. 
4.26 Nevertheless, numerous NAO reports and books such as The Blunders of our Governments6 
reveal that, in spite of long experience, this is not always done well. It is therefore essential to 
take this pillar seriously. Unless inputs are well-managed, it is impossible to deliver optimal 
public value. The pillar is split into four ‘areas to consider’. 
Processes to manage resources 
4.27 Effective financial planning and management processes are critical for responsible 
administration of resources. Without them resources are unlikely to be allocated effectively and 
deployed efficiently, thereby undermining public value. 
4.28 This area explores how well public bodies understand the total resources available and the 
sources of their funding. It also seeks evidence that the risks or volatility of that funding are 
understood and anticipated, and what contingency plans exist to address funding pressures.  
The area covers financial planning processes by seeking evidence of integrated performance and 
financial plans (possibly integrated in to SDPs), the processes to regularly review the use of 
resources, and the criteria by which to justify allocations. Finally, this area assesses the quality of 
6 ‘The Blunders of our Governments’, Anthony King & Ivor Crewe, 2013 
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management information and the extent to which it is used to explore what works and inform 
key decisions across the organisation.  
Quality of data and forecasts 
4.29 This area sets the expectation that public bodies will be able to track resource as it is spent 
throughout the entire delivery chain, and that it can accurately forecast the level of spending. It 
also looks at forecasting: for instance, whether overspends in the current year could create 
pressures in future years. Both are crucial to the efficient deployment of funds. 
4.30 The Framework tests this by seeking evidence of how spending is split by programme and 
economic category and whether public bodies can track how much has been spent, where, and 
on what. It explores the quality of centrally-held departmental spending data and whether in-
year spending forecasts are timely and accurate. It also seeks evidence linking the purchase of 
inputs to the delivery of outputs, and the processes in place to use this information to inform 
future decisions on the purchase of inputs. 
Benchmarking and cost control 
4.31 Benchmarking is a key tool for improving performance, particularly in common areas of 
spend. For instance, if all departments can match the performance of the top 20% in (say) travel 
costs per person then this could deliver significant savings to government. Similarly, it can 
provide valuable insights into organisational structure (e.g. the split between front- and back-
office) and reward.  
4.32 The Framework examines this area by seeking evidence of relevant benchmarking being 
undertaken and explanations for any discrepancies. It asks whether the public body has 
processes in place to use this data to improve efficiency performance. It also assesses whether 
systems are in place to monitor and control costs in real-time, alongside reliable and well-
understood processes for passing information on escalating costs to senior decision-makers. 
Cost-shifting 
4.33 Cost-shifting can either be across departments (the Home Office, for instance, could 
increase costs for the Ministry of Justice by focusing policing activity on crimes where the trials 
are longer and more expensive) or across time periods (a department creating costs tomorrow 
through activity today). Failing to understand these interdependencies leads to narrow thinking 
and cost pressures across government. 
4.34 The Framework tests this by requiring public bodies to have an effective strategy for 
managing the risk of reliance on other public bodies for funding, and understand the 
magnitude of risks posed to other parts of the public sector and end-users by delivery failure. 
Public bodies should have the systems in place to monitor and mitigate this risks, and avoid 
deferring spending to realise savings. 
Pillar 3: Engaging Users and Citizens 
4.35 Pillar 3 is in some ways the most challenging of the pillars to define and apply. However, it 
is of such importance that it cannot be left out.  
4.36 To start, it may be worth saying what it is not. It is not a matter of using public satisfaction 
polls as an indicator of success. Public satisfaction will rise and fall for a range of reasons, some 
of them completely irrelevant to the quality of services being provided. Moreover, necessary 
reforms are often controversial and sometimes lead to a temporary fall in satisfaction indicators: 
to allow that to divert reform would be a counter-productive failure of nerve. 
32 
4.37 Instead this section of the Framework aims to ensure that citizen perspectives are 
incorporated into policy and delivery without encouraging dependence on superficial indicators 
of satisfaction. It does so because public value is in part self-fulfilling: a public service is 
genuinely more valuable (and taxpayers more likely to be willing to fund it) if citizens believe in 
its value and commit to it.   
4.38 Public service providers therefore need legitimacy: that citizens and taxpayers believe the 
services being provided are worthwhile, well-managed and worth spending public money on. 
For this reason, governments and leaders of public services need to be in continuous dialogue 
with citizens, both about the services being provided and how they might be reformed. This is 
not a question of party politics; it is one of determining value. 
4.39 There are then a subset of taxpayers and citizens who are the actual users of any given 
service.  Here too engagement is vital. Every taxpayer contributes to our schools but only 
children and their parents are direct users of them. If the children and their parents are engaged 
not just in general but specifically – reading at bedtime to a young child or ensuring homework 
is done well – then the service and its outcomes will be significantly better at no extra cost. 
Children will learn to read sooner and more fluently, and be more likely to succeed in future. 
Similarly, in healthcare, recovery from accident or illness is likely to be faster and better if the 
patient is engaged and an active participant in their recovery - exercising a recovering broken 
limb, for example.  
4.40 This question of user engagement applies to more aspects of public service and 
expenditure than is apparent at first glance. The security of cities or public transport, for 
instance, clearly depends on not only the police, intelligence agencies and so on, but also the 
vigilance of citizens. The overall health of the population depends both on citizen choices 
(stopping smoking, reducing drinking, eating healthily, exercising regularly) and on the quality of 
hospitals. In short, good outcomes often depend as much on public engagement as they do on 
public expenditure. 
4.41 There is always a risk for governments in drawing attention to the value of citizen 
engagement; namely that when they do so, it is all too likely that they will be accused of making 
that case in order to cut funding for public services. This is unfortunate and misleading, and 
based on a false dichotomy – that either government picks up the tab or it asks citizens to act 
on their behalf. The argument here is that both matter. Effective public services combined with 
judicious user and citizen engagement will deliver the best public value. 
4.42 User and citizen engagement is therefore a central part of the Framework. These themes 
are picked up in three areas. 
Public and taxpayer legitimacy 
4.43 As noted above, a clear understanding of taxpayer perceptions of legitimacy and their 
drivers is essential to maximising public value. A public service is more valuable if taxpayers and 
citizens believe in it, are willing to fund it, and commit to supporting its outcomes more widely. 
4.44 The Framework explores this by asking that public bodies have an awareness of what 
taxpayers think about the policy or programme, what influences these perceptions, and have an 
effective strategy for enhancing taxpayer understanding of the policy aims. It further seeks 
evidence of a successful track record of influencing public and taxpayer perceptions, and that 
the public body has devised measures to ensure key players in the delivery chain understand 
their role in improving taxpayer and public perceptions.  
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User and client experience and participation 
4.45 This area explores the extent to which users of the service are engaged. Actively engaging 
service users can often improve service outcomes without significantly increasing inputs, thereby 
increasing public value. 
4.46 Here the Framework seeks evidence of understanding of user and client experience and 
what shapes this, together with an effective strategy for influencing that experience. It also looks 
for comprehension of why there is demand for its services, and a strategy to manage increases 
in demand when they arise. Understanding the cumulative impact of different programmes on 
users and clients – seeing the bigger picture – is crucial to this. The public body should 
understand how engagement compares to benchmarks, and what the drivers of participation 
are. 
Key stakeholder engagement 
4.47 In addition to citizen, taxpayer and user engagement, many services rely on active 
engagement with often influential stakeholders. This can be difficult to get right, but there is 
little doubting the value of doing so. Success should not be measured by whether at any given 
moment, stakeholders support government policy; indeed, sometimes success will depend on 
not making concessions to win over the recalcitrant. What matters is whether stakeholders 
understand the approach and can, over time, increasingly be brought on board. 
4.48 The Framework tests this by examining the extent to which the identity and interest of key 
interest or stakeholder groups are understood. It also explores whether the public body 
understands how to influence the perceptions of these groups, and has an effective strategy to 
manage their support for a policy or programme. 
Pillar 4: Developing System Capacity 
4.49 Pillar 4 is important because it is about the underlying quality and resilience of a service. It 
would be perfectly possible to achieve short and medium-term outcomes (Pillar 1), to control 
costs (Pillar 2), and generate short-term citizen/user satisfaction and engagement (Pillar 3), while 
neglecting the long-term capacity of the system (Pillar 4).   
4.50 Pillar 4 is therefore about stewardship – leaving a given service or institution in better shape 
than you found it. Governments are often accused of being ‘short-termist’ or ‘only interested in 
the next election’. Often such criticism is unfounded, but the concept of stewardship is critical to 
managing any such tendency that does arise.   
4.51 To provide an illustration – the government recently announced that it would fund 500 
additional places for the training of doctors in medical schools. It is doing so because it predicts 
demand for them some years hence. Given that it takes a minimum of six years to train a doctor, 
that investment will not deliver improved outcomes in the current Parliament, yet it will have a 
significant immediate cost. In effect, it is an act of stewardship. 
4.52 Similarly, the impending introduction of a National Funding Formula for the school system 
is unlikely to affect outcomes in the short term. It should help to manage inputs more 
transparently and may improve the quality of the dialogue about school funding between 
government and parents or taxpayers. Mainly though it is an act of stewardship, an underlying 
reform of what we might think of as the plumbing of the school system designed to make it 
stronger, fairer and more resilient in the long term. 
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4.53 Pillar 4 aims to ensure that such acts of stewardship are recognised and valued. A service 
that neglects stewardship is likely to cost more and deliver less in future, therefore it is critical to 
recognise such acts now to ensure they continue. This pillar breaks down into six areas.  
Capacity to innovate and learn from innovation 
4.54 Continuous innovation (either marginal or disruptive) is key to improving outcomes while 
reducing costs. This area explores the extent to which organisations are innovating, how they 
are doing so, and whether the processes are in place to share best practice across the 
organisation. 
4.55 The Framework therefore seeks evidence of innovation being promoted within the public 
body’s performance culture, the development and adoption of new technologies to either 
reduce costs or improve outcomes (or both), and the use of behavioural insights to reduce 
demand or improve performance. It also assesses whether past learning and examples of 
effective performance are transmitted throughout the organisation and utilised effectively.  
Capacity to plan and deliver 
4.56 To maximise value, public bodies often need to prioritise outcomes and activities, making 
tough choices where necessary. This area explores whether departments have robust planning 
processes to deliver defined outcomes, alongside effective accountability processes that make 
clear who is supposed to be delivering what, how and by when. 
4.57 The Framework looks for evidence of a rationalised plan, with correct actions identified to 
implement the overall strategy and meaningful milestones set, and named people throughout 
the delivery chain, whose roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and who are held to 
account with effective mechanisms. It also requires departments to prioritise outcomes where 
necessary. This is evidence that could be found, for example, in a department’s SDP. 
Capacity to engage with delivery chain 
4.58 However determined the minister or government department might be to make change – 
to cut crime, for example – in the end they depend on frontline staff, to actually make it 
happen. The delivery chain is the set of relationships between the minister at one end and the 
frontline workforce at the other, and is often highly complex. Understanding how delivery chains 
are structured, including weak points in the system, is essential to the effective management of 
public services. This includes developing strategies to manage and influence the chain and 
ensuring policy or programme owners have the necessary levers to influence it. 
4.59 This is examined by looking at understanding of the delivery chain (i.e. the key people, 
stakeholders, customers etc. within it), its weaknesses, and the strategies in place for 
strengthening them. It also looks at accountability throughout the chain. The Framework also 
examines staff engagement strategies to help staff to understand their role in the chain, and 
provides a mechanism for feedback on the service. Exit mechanisms should also exist when 
services or activities are no longer providing value, potentially to be replaced by new providers. 
Capacity to work across organisational boundaries 
4.60 Effective collaboration across departmental or agency boundaries is fundamental to 
maximising public value, especially on intractable, cross-cutting issues like mental health. There 
are numerous examples where this has not always succeeded: often these can be traced to poor 
interpersonal or interorganisational relationships. However, as the case study in Box 4.B shows, 
there are practical steps which, if taken, can make a significant positive difference.  
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Box 4.B: The Better Public Services Results Programme in New Zealand7 
New Zealand’s Better Public Services (BPS) Results programme was structured around a 
system of interagency performance targets, to provide a framework for collaboration on ten 
intractable cross-cutting problems that were important to New Zealanders. Five-year targets 
were set for each problem, with six-monthly reports to the public and Parliament instituted 
to keep work on each issue high profile. Collective accountability was instituted for agency 
heads, with all individuals held responsible for progress towards results. However, the main 
levers were less about accountability and more about public service motivation, generating 
cultural impetus across the public sector to improve people’s lives, and connecting public 
servants’ work to that overarching goal. The BPS Results were few and specific, meaning that 
every public servant involved in delivering them could remember all ten, while the scope of 
each remained manageable and enabled ‘small wins’ to be achieved regularly. The Results 
also focused on improvement rather than minimum standards; as opposed to putting New 
Zealand’s 20 Health Boards in competition with each other to improve immunisation rates, 
for instance, the health sector as a whole was put in charge of improving the national 
immunisation rate above its historic levels. The Results focused on intermediate outcomes, 
which helped support the intrinsic motivation of public servants, and the programme took 
care to highlight positive stories of innovative practice. Targets are all about quantitative 
success, but ministers, the public, and public servants relate more to narratives. These 
individualised stories made the changes more relatable, but were also seen as a reward for 
innovation. 
4.61 The Framework assesses the extent of collaborative working with other public bodies, 
considering evidence of new relationships being forged and developed and examples of effective 
collaboration being promoted and celebrated. It also looks for evidence of teams working across 
functional boundaries within public bodies, and understanding across the organisation of the 
benefits of collaboration, along with incentives to encourage this. 
Capacity of the workforce 
4.62 Delivering public value requires the right number of people, with the right mix of skills, in 
the right environment. A good workforce strategy, including anticipating future requirements, is 
therefore essential in building the capacity of the public body to deliver desired outcomes in the 
long term. 
4.63 The Framework explores the quality of a public body’s workforce strategy, specifically 
looking at its links to wider service delivery goals, identification of workforce issues (such as 
recruitment and retention, skills gaps) and strategies to address these, and definition of future 
requirements. It also examines whether public bodies are using data and indicators to monitor 
the implementation of the strategy, and whether processes exist to manage challenges as they 
arise. There should also be evidence that the public body is developing its capacity to manage 
change – including political and organisational changes – and unexpected pressures such as 
sudden increases in demand. 
Capacity to review performance data and evaluate impact 
4.64 Delivering public value across large systems is impossible without good data. This section 
of the Framework examines whether public bodies have the systems in place at all levels to 
7 ‘Interagency Performance Targets: A Case Study of New Zealand’s Results Programme’, IBM Center for The Business of Government, 2017 (available
at: https://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/Case-Study-Interagency-Performance-Targets-IBMCCAG-2017.pdf)   
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gather and evaluate accurate, timely performance data. Effective systems allow public bodies to 
take swift remedial action when problems arise, and to understand whether actions are having 
the intended impact. It also assesses whether this data is being used to analyse the relative 
effectiveness of various policy interventions and why the chosen policy (or combination of 
policies) is optimal. 
4.65 The Framework requires that appropriate analysis of performance information is 
undertaken at appropriate intervals, and that the public body has sufficient data on local and 
regional performance by category. It also seeks evidence of how data is disaggregated in other 
ways to drive improvements, and evidence of timely, effective interventions when issues arise.  
Conclusion 
4.66 Defining the ingredients of public value in depth, and specifying them in detail in the 
Framework, would change the nature of the dialogue between the Treasury and departments as 
well as inside and among departments. It would create a common language across the public 
sector about public value. And it would facilitate shared learning not just within a given 
department or system but across all areas of public expenditure. It should enable continuous 
improvement and, as a result, increase the public value delivered to taxpayers.
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5 
Using the Public Value 
Framework 
Introduction 
5.1 The Framework outlined in Chapter 4 provides an opportunity to take a substantial step 
forward in measuring and improving public sector productivity and public value. However to be 
effective, it will need to become embedded as an essential part of routine departmental business 
and fully integrated into the Treasury’s public spending processes and routines. Given the 
immediate everyday challenges of government this is unlikely to be easy or straightforward. 
Principles 
5.2 Nor is it something the Treasury is likely to manage alone. Active collaboration with the 
Cabinet Office (a key ingredient of success in recent years) and all Whitehall departments will be 
essential. In the preparation of this report, a good deal of time has been invested in constructive 
consultation with the Cabinet Office and major spending departments to understand both what 
should be in the Framework and how it might be used. The result of these conversations has 
been a set of principles on which to base the next phase of its development. These are set out 
below. 
5.3 It is important to emphasise, however, that creating an effective dialogue between the 
Treasury and departments about public value will require changes to how both parties interact. 
Treasury ministers have made it clear that they want to see a change in the nature of the 
dialogue between Treasury officials and spending departments. They also want the rules of the 
game to be established and maintained rather than altered part way through. Treasury officials 
themselves are also determined to bring this about. This change of culture should not in any 
way reduce the Treasury's tight grip on expenditure control, which remains vital to the country's 
economic prospects. Changes can be made in departments too – particularly in moving beyond 
their zero-sum approach to negotiating. Good faith will be required on both sides if the impasse 
is to be broken. There are those who argue that the nature of this longstanding relationship will 
never change. However, experience elsewhere – such as in Indiana under Mitch Daniels – 
suggests a more productive way is possible and the taxpayer has every right to expect it can be 
found. 
Constructive 
5.4 Occasionally relationships between the Treasury and departments have become challenging. 
The Treasury has been seen as not just interested in controlling expenditure (which people 
recognise it has to do), but taking a negative standpoint in case a new idea might lead to new 
costs. It can also be seen as stifling departmental performance through restrictive budgeting 
rules and layers of process, and then conducting the occasional shakedown when the coffers 
run low. Meanwhile departments can be seen from the Treasury perspective as the covetous 
children, unconcerned by the family’s financial situation and keen to spend every penny they 
have however they choose. What can be lost when tensions are high is the common ground 
shared by both. Both are interested in improving the quality of public services. Both also believe 
these services should be delivered cost effectively. Both are interested in exploring the best way 
to achieve these aims. And, of course, both serve the government of the day. 
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5.5 These tensions are, to an extent, inherent between service providers and finance 
departments; certainly they are found in many parts of the world. Similar dynamics can also be 
found at different levels in the delivery chain. It is precisely this culture of suspicion that will 
need to be overcome if the Framework is to be successful and contribute to changing cultures. 
The Treasury and departments will need to focus on areas of common ground and resolve 
disagreements through discussion of the evidence. Furthermore, to become properly embedded, 
this attitude will need to be underpinned, not by fear of the consequences of being 
unconstructive, but by a mutual recognition of what can be achieved through constructive 
collaboration. The Framework and the public value agenda it sets will be successful to the extent 
to which all key players are willing to engage with it: the more that is invested in it, the more it 
will return, the more the culture will change and the more public value will be delivered.  
Credible 
5.6 One of the strengths of the Framework is its ability to both measure performance and 
diagnose how that performance could be improved. For these judgements to be effective, 
though, they must be credible. They must be made by well-informed professionals, based on the 
most relevant, up-to-date and accurate information available. This will mean drawing on the 
best expertise available across government. On commercial matters, for instance, the judgement 
of the experts within the Government Commercial Function will be more informed and 
professional than that of the Treasury. In assessing a body’s commercial capability within the 
Framework, it therefore seems sensible to draw on the judgements made by the function on 
commercial standards (if available) rather than attempt to do so independently. Similarly, the 
deep knowledge within frontline services could be used to support judgements, either through 
individuals joining review teams or fieldwork being undertaken to explore aspects of the system.  
Thorough 
5.7 As noted above, credible judgements require relevant, up-to-date and accurate information.  
To achieve this, assessments will need to be appropriately thorough in gathering data and 
evidence. Clearly this will require a trade-off. It would be virtually impossible to gather and 
assess all the data and evidence produced by any department on a single day, much less over an 
extended period. Equally a Review team could spend months or years attempting to gather 
evidence in some of the more qualitative areas of the Framework without making much 
progress. However, since quality evidence is a precursor to effective decisions, rigorous evidence-
gathering will improve the effectiveness of the Framework. 
5.8 This should not necessarily lead to additional work for departments. As a rule of thumb, the 
Framework should not require a department to collect data that it does not need for itself. 
Reviews should (in theory) only involve evidence that either already exists or would be of 
additional value to the department concerned. Manufacturing evidence for the purposes of 
performing well at assessment is counter-productive to all parties and is something that should 
be actively discouraged. Without honest evidence (whatever picture it paints) it is difficult to 
make progress. 
Impartial 
5.9 Impartiality is important for two reasons. First, given the possibility of mutual suspicion 
between the Treasury and departments, so far as is possible, it is vital that the reviews are seen 
as impartial. There will inevitably be instances of disagreement over either a judgement or a 
recommendation. In these cases it will be important that Reviews have a clear, simple process 
for resolving this that both sides can trust. However, disagreement itself should not necessarily 
be seen as a failure: it is precisely through vigorous, plain-speaking discussion that the best 
solutions are likely to be found. Second, just as it is difficult to make progress without honest 
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evidence, so it is without honest judgement. Judgements designed to serve an agenda other 
than identifying the best route to improvement are likely to be destructive. To be seen as fair 
and objective, judgements need to be owned and understood both by the Treasury and 
departments. Generally speaking, a department will be more knowledgeable about the services 
it is responsible for while the Treasury will know more about how that department compares to 
others.  
Complementary 
5.10 As noted in Chapter 2, there is plenty of work underway across government and within 
departments exploring various aspects of public sector productivity and public value. Much of 
this is already coordinated from the centre with mature processes for engagement with 
departments, such as SDPs (run jointly by the Cabinet Office and the Treasury) and various 
projects across the functional agenda (led by the Cabinet Office). Adding another process with 
another set of timescales and standards to an already crowded space risks creating confusion 
and unnecessary additional work. 
5.11 For the Framework to be effective, Reviews will therefore need to align with and 
complement existing processes both across government and within departments. SDPs, for 
instance, are the government’s planning and performance framework. Where the Framework 
seeks evidence that a department or programme has a clearly defined set of objectives, spending 
and implementation plans for how to achieve them, and indicators and KPIs to monitor 
performance, evidence for this will often be found in the SDP. When assessments are made on 
quality of this evidence, those running the SDP process are likely to be best placed to make 
them.  
Appropriately incentivised 
5.12 In the conversations with departments and finance ministries about this report – both in 
the UK and overseas – it was repeatedly emphasised that for Reviews to be taken seriously they 
had to matter. There had to be either a carrot or a stick, otherwise the activity was unlikely to be 
given much attention. Equally important, though, is that the incentives are appropriate.  
Incentives that are too onerous are likely to encourage either attempts to circumvent or 
undermine the credibility of the exercise; those that are not onerous enough are unlikely to be 
effective. Reviews will, therefore, need to have consequences; but these should be finely tuned 
to incentivise an honest, plain-speaking conversation.  
Accessible 
5.13 Well-presented information is key to effective communication. If the Framework is to be 
successful at fostering a new, more constructive dialogue on public spending, clear presentation 
of assessment outcomes to officials and ministers will be critical. This will require presenting 
information in a way that is intuitive while remaining informative, and capable of being 
understood by somebody unfamiliar with the specifics of the department or programme in 
question. The design of the Framework should help. The Reviews will also need to be clear on 
what needs to improve and how this can be achieved, identifying actions with responsibilities, 
timescales and accountability.  
Using the Framework 
5.14 These principles will be invaluable in exploring the series of practical questions necessary to 
undertake effective Public Value Reviews. These questions broadly cover five areas. 
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Who? 
5.15 Reviews will work best as joint enterprises between the assessors and the assessed. In each 
instance the composition of this project team will need to be determined. The Framework has a 
broad scope, and is therefore likely to require input from across different business areas within a 
department (rather than just a single function e.g. finance). Activity within the assessed entity 
will need to be coordinated, while the assessing team will need to ensure it has the necessary 
skills, expertise and capacity to undertake the exercise. The Review team will need to be small 
enough to be agile, but also large enough to involve people from the Treasury and departments 
as well as the services affected. The team will also need strong statistical and analytical 
capabilities. This could mean around 6-10 people for no more than a month, each giving the 
review their priority attention. 
What? 
5.16 The scope of the Review will need to be clear from the outset. This could be determined by 
looking at either: (1) a particular budget or public service; or (2) a particular outcome, then 
working backwards through outputs to establish the resources available to deliver those outputs 
(recognising these may cross departmental boundaries). 
When? 
5.17 The aspiration is for Reviews to become embedded in routines and processes across the 
public sector. Assessments are therefore likely to be regular exercises, though how regularly they 
recur and the timing of these recurrences will need to be established. They will also need to be 
coordinated with the timescales of existing central processes, such as those for SDPs.  
How? 
5.18 While assessments across different public services and at different stages of the delivery 
chain are unlikely to be identical, there will need to be a consistent set of methodological 
questions to consider in each case. These will include the process of gathering evidence, making 
judgements and resolving disputes. Reviews need to be swift and not get mired in bureaucracy 
and meetings.  
5.19 The completed Reviews would result in a searchable database which would, as it became 
more extensive, have tremendous value as a source of insight into how to maximise public value. 
Incentives 
5.20 As noted above, reviews using the Framework need appropriate incentives to gain traction. 
What these are will depend on the specifics of each case. The way in which reviews are 
conducted by the assessing entity will determine which incentives are appropriate.  
Interdependence 
5.21 The questions above are interdependent: certain answers will affect the choices available 
within others. The resource available to the review team may affect the scope and regularity of 
the reviews, while also affecting the expertise and subsequent credibility of the 
recommendations. If Reviews are less frequent, they may need greater scope and rigour to 
become effectively embedded. Scope may restrict what incentives are available: it may not be 
appropriate to put a blunt incentive around a Review with a narrowly defined scope. 
Methodology will affect both timing (assessments that require more evidence-gathering are 
likely to take longer) and resource (will likely require more people). To maximise effectiveness the 
whole system will need to align. There will therefore need to be consideration of the best review 
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pattern ahead of conducting any particular assessment. Either way, a Review should always be a 
collaborative exercise, with the parameters of the Review agreed to achieve the common 
objective of better understanding the process of delivering public value, and of what can be 
done to add further value. 
Treasury implementation 
5.22 The set of questions and considerations outlined above are designed to support Reviews 
throughout the delivery chain. Each entity within that chain would have to consider how best to 
use the Framework. From the Treasury’s perspective, this is likely to involve applying the 
Framework to large areas of spend such as whole departments, large programmes, or high-level 
outcomes. This could be achieved through: 
• Light-touch roll-out through HMT Spending Teams: undertake an initial assessment
of either a whole department or its major programmes over a two-month period,
roughly broken down in to four phases (scoping, evidence gathering, assessment,
recommendations). This is an opportunity for the Treasury and departments to
become accustomed to using the Framework to assess spending, performance and
capacity. It is likely to use existing data and evidence where available and develop
joint judgements. The final output may be discussed at a ministerial bilateral
between the relevant Secretary of State and the Chief Secretary.
• Intensive exploration of specific areas of spend: following the same timescales and
process as above, except focused on specific areas of spend that are either complex,
contentious or at risk. These are likely to involve gathering new evidence (e.g.
through focus groups, engagement with key stakeholders etc.) as well as more
rigorous examination of existing evidence.
5.23 A number of departments have volunteered to take part in an initial phase of Reviews 
between November 2017 and mid-2018. It should therefore be possible to test a variety of 
approaches and then refine them. 
Summary 
5.24 To be effective, the Framework needs to become embedded in the routines and processes 
of government. Achieving this is unlikely to be straightforward; cultural change is inherently 
challenging. Nor is it likely to happen overnight. Reviews will need to improve over time with 
better methodology, stronger incentives, and experienced assessors. The principles in this 
chapter provide the foundation for the development of this important work on productivity and 
public value. 
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6 
Key building blocks of the 
Framework 
Introduction 
6.1 The Public Value Framework provides a tool for measuring the likelihood that an 
organisation or programme is maximising the public value it delivers from the funding allocated 
to it. The Framework though, is only as powerful as the data and information available to make 
the judgements required. Likewise, the remedy proposed will only be effective if the system is 
ready and willing to innovate and change as necessary following the outcome of a review.  
6.2 This brings us to the final focus of the review. We have considered not only what processes 
are relevant to maximising public value and measuring the likelihood of it being delivered (the 
pillars and areas to consider in the Framework), but also the key drivers of improved outcomes. 
This chapter examines the role of two powerful drivers in delivering public value: comprehensive, 
accurate and timely data; and innovation (both incremental and disruptive, to use the terms 
made familiar by Clayton Christensen and Joseph Bower).1 These are both areas where the 
Treasury could and should make sharper demands of departments and agencies. 
The central importance of data 
Background 
6.3 As Chapter 4 makes clear, the Public Value Framework is dependent on data: without good 
evidence, no reliable judgements can be made. The data requirements of the Framework are 
substantial. In Pillars 1 and 2, data underpins judgements such as whether historic performance 
is understood and reflected in new policy making or whether comprehensive management 
information is available to decision makers. Without data, it will not be possible to determine 
within Pillar 3 whether the strategy employed to influence the experience of users and clients is 
proving successful. And likewise, for Pillar 4; how could the Treasury or the leaders of a public 
body tell whether they are strengthening the long-term health or resilience of an organisation 
without data and evidence?   
6.4 As far as possible, this data needs to be accurate, impartial and timely. Should the outcome 
of a review point to the need, for example, to reassess the governance of a project, it would be 
vital that that judgement is accepted and acted upon rather than endlessly disputed. This is far 
more likely if all parties trust the evidence on which the assessment has been made. 
6.5 The importance of good data and analysis is not a new conclusion; the benefits have been 
well recognised in government. Data is an essential tool for maximising public value, as it allows 
those responsible to:  
• understand the problems faced by government and how public money can be best
spent to resolve them;
• provide evidence of the effectiveness of interventions, leading to stronger policy
decisions that reflect what works;
1 ‘Technologies: Catching the Wave’, Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, 1995 
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• inform and challenge policy decisions, recognising failure and sharing knowledge;
and
• bolster accountability by ensuring the public and Parliament have the information
they need to hold budget holders to account.
Existing data initiatives 
6.6 The government is already taking a range of steps to improve the quality and analysis of, 
and access to, its data. As part of the Financial Management Review, a team of analysts, 
accountants, economists, and strategy leads has been built in the Treasury to work with 
departments on understanding the inputs, outputs and cost drivers of large, cross-cutting areas 
of spending. These Costing Projects are taken forward in collaboration with departments and 
allow both parties to better understand cost drivers, and often identify improvements to reduce 
those costs and boost productivity. 
6.7 The Treasury is also working with departments to improve the quality and consistency of 
financial data through cross-government data sprints. These examine how the financial data 
held in departments can be mapped more effectively to facilitate easier analysis and use across 
multiple user groups. When implemented, the improvements made through these data sprints 
could allow government to better understand, for example, what it spends on commonly-
procured items like IT and, over time, improve its ability to benchmark effectively. 
6.8 Beyond the Treasury, work is also underway across central and local government on 
improving data quality and use: 
• The Government Transformation Strategy 2017, published by the Government
Digital Service (GDS), recognises the complexities of developing relevant and timely
data and analysis for government activity, and the challenge of securing access to
data held outside of individual organisations in order to drive better outcomes and
decisions.
• The Data Leaders Network is making progress in understanding how to share data
outside of traditional departmental and organisation boundaries.
• The Office for National Statistics launched their Data Science Campus and Economic
Statistics Centre of Excellence in March 2017, bringing economists together with
the technology and digital skills needed to support government information
infrastructure and decision-making.
• Within the HM Prisons and Probation Service, part of the Ministry of Justice, a
performance hub has been set up to consolidate data from a number of products
and sources and allowing over 3,000 users to interact with it directly, uploading
new data and carrying out benchmarking analysis.
• New devolution deals are starting to build on progress in London and Greater
Manchester by considering the impact that improved data analytics can have on
service delivery.
6.9 These are just a fraction of the welcome and important data-related initiatives ongoing 
across government. However, given the era we live in, the opportunities and challenges in this 
area are likely to increase. Continued focus therefore on improving the quality, analysis and use 
of data will be imperative to maximising public value in the coming years. 
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Recommendations 
6.10 The Treasury can and should use the Framework and the proposed Public Value Reviews to 
raise the profile of existing data initiatives across government, support those leading this work 
and demand more from departments to maximise their use of data. 
6.11 The Treasury has many levers by which it can achieve this, particularly as it allocates 
budgets to departments. Mitch Daniels in Indiana again provides an instructive example here. 
His Central Budget Office took the view that large budgets could not be justified without data 
systems being in place to measure their impact. It made this point explicit by linking budget 
allocations to departmental willingness to set up the data systems that would enable them to 
track progress against outcomes. The Treasury should look to follow this example. This could be 
done on an ad hoc basis as business cases are approved; it could be a requirement of the 
Spending Review process; or it could be in return for the delegated authority it provides 
departments to spend public money. In the era of ‘big data’ and ubiquitous technology, it is 
hard to justify not doing so. 
Using data to deliver marginal gains and incentivise innovation 
Background 
6.12 If the government is to achieve the sought after culture change, it needs to exploit 
effectively the data available to it: that much is indisputable. In improving the delivery of 
services, it specifically needs to understand what the data says about what does and does not 
work. If the Framework helps to deliver this, then government will be able to unlock ongoing 
marginal improvements to public services. 
6.13 The concept of marginal gains is based on Kaizen, the Japanese business philosophy of 
continuous improvement, involving all employees in the search for solutions. The 2015 Public 
Sector Efficiency Challenge was arguably an attempt at employing Kaizen by the UK 
government, engaging directly with those in the know to improve service delivery. More 
famously, the theory was applied by Sir Dave Brailsford, who harnessed the approach to develop 
the British cycling team, from a single gold medal win in 76 years to winning eight out of ten 
gold medals at the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and a further eight at the London Olympics in 
2012.2 He has since adopted a similar approach at Team Sky, which has won five of the last six 
Tours de France. Box 6.A provides examples of this theory being applied in public sector 
organisations, both in the UK and internationally. 
Box 6.A: Examples of Kaizen in public sector organisations 
Virginia Mason, Seattle 
At Virginia Mason, a hospital in Seattle, staff were encouraged to file reports about anything 
that went wrong. Consequently, the hospital was able to analyse the data gathered and 
implement a number of small improvements. These included improved patient wristbands, 
ergonomic design of surgical equipment, and operating theatre checklists. The overall 
improvement achieved by these changes contributed to a 74% reduction in liability insurance 
premiums for the hospital.3 
2  available at: https://www.britishcycling.org.uk/gbcyclingteam/article/Gbrst_gb-cyclingteam-GB-Cycling-Team-Medal-History--0?c=EN
3 ‘Transforming Health Care: Virginia Mason Medical Center’s Pursuit of the Perfect Patient Experience’, Charles Kennedy, 2010 
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Box 6.B: Examples of Kaizen in public sector organisations (Continued) 
Western Sussex Trust 
Western Sussex Hospital’s Patient First programme4 uses the Kaizen approach to improve 
hospital performance, patient experience and staff engagement, creating better public value 
in every strand of the trust’s activities. Staff training by the in-house Kaizen team combined 
with organisation-wide shared purpose enables staff to take ownership of their own 
performance and independently drive improvements where they work. Their Patient First 
Improvement System makes continuous improvement part of everyone’s day-to-day role. For 
example, at daily huddles staff suggest improvements and agree solutions. Many may seem 
relatively minor but the hundreds of solutions enacted every day create a momentum of 
positive change, improving patient experience as well as public value. Colleagues use lean 
problem-solving to tackle more entrenched problems too. For example, the organisation has 
reduced the average time for delivery of take home medications from three hours to ten 
minutes; improved delayed discharges from critical care by 90%; and has reduced inpatient 
falls trust-wide by 30%. 
6.14 The Harvard Business Review says that to deliver marginal gains, an organisation must 
focus on ‘progression, and compound the improvements’.5 The search for marginal gains should 
be continuous and integral to the ways officials and departments across Whitehall work. The 
(justly) renowned Nudge Unit (otherwise known as the Behavioural Insights Team) has been a 
pioneer within government for this way of working. In collaboration with departments, their 
experimental approach, drawing always on good timely data, has enabled numerous 
departments and agencies to make small, often low- to zero-cost, changes that have 
significantly improved outcomes. The Cabinet Office and the Treasury are now championing this 
approach through the broader “What Works” initiative (see box 6.C). This kind of thinking 
should become part of the way things are always done across the public sector.  
6.15 As well as effective data analysis, it is vital that government has effective knowledge 
management to ensure successful innovations are diffused across the public sector. Exchanging 
information effectively allows government to share knowledge, build corporate memory, and 
understand the influence of the past on current and future events. Exploiting the experience, 
knowledge, expertise and information that individuals create or acquire during their work is the 
key to achieving this and should be an integral part of working in government. It will also help 
minimise the unjustifiable discrepancies in performance and share best practice, compounding 
marginal improvements across the whole system and leading to greater gains in productivity and 
performance. The Cabinet Office’s Better Information for Better Government programme is an 
excellent start, however more can still be done. 
4  available at: http://www.westernsussexhospitals.nhs.uk/your-trust/performance/patient-first/
5 ‘How 1% Performance Improvements led to Olympic Gold’, Eben Harrell, 2015
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Box 6.C: What Works Initiative 
“What Works” is an initiative launched by HMT and the Cabinet Office in 2013 to ensure 
that the best available evidence informs spending decisions. It brings together a network of 
10 independent What Works Centres that assess the existing evidence base in specific policy 
areas and issue guidance on cost effective practice. Where evidence is weak or unavailable, 
these organisations help decision-makers in government and frontline services by 
commissioning trials to test what works. The Education Endowment Foundation, for 
instance, has more than doubled the amount of evidence available from education trials in 
this country, transforming our understanding of how to improve attainment in the 
classroom. The network is coordinated by the Cabinet Office What Works Team, which 
operates across government both to share findings from the centres and support civil 
servants in generating evidence through high quality experimental methods. They run an 
innovative Trial Advice Panel with experts from government and academia that has now 
supported 18 departments and agencies in testing whether their policies and programmes 
are working. 
Recommendation 
6.16 As the government continues to seek opportunities to harness data and share its 
knowledge, there is every reason to believe that year-on-year, nudge-by-nudge, there should be 
improvements in performance across the board as a matter of course and without extra cost. 
The Framework makes this expectation clear: Pillar 4 explores the extent to which the 
organisation’s performance culture encourages innovation. This should be reinforced by a clear 
expectation from the Treasury that public services will deliver marginal improvements year-on-
year at no extra cost.  
The need for disruption 
Background 
6.17 However, ongoing marginal improvements alone are insufficient. Periodically, disruptive 
innovation is also required, particularly from those organisations pushing the boundaries. The 
term ‘disruptive innovation’6 describes a practice where established processes are displaced by a 
completely novel and often lower cost way of achieving the same or better outcomes. The 
impact of mobile phones on fixed line telephony, the rise of online shopping, or the impact of 
the gig economy on holiday accommodation or taxi services are all examples of this type of 
change.  
6.18 Disruptive innovation should also become part of the new normal for government and the 
public sector. Across the public sector, there should be a constant search for new ways of 
achieving the same or better outcomes at lower cost. 
6.19 The map below, explicitly derived from the work of Hood and Dixon, illustrates how 
policies and innovations could be mapped, with the marginal gains spread through the 
yellow/green swathe of the chart and the disruptive innovations in the top left hand (green) 
corner. 
6 ‘Technologies: Catching the Wave’, Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, 1995
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Chart 6.A: Mapping the impact of new policies7 
Existing work 
6.20 Policy innovation at the centre of government is supported through the Policy Lab, a part 
of Cabinet Office. Funded by departments, the Policy Lab focuses on supporting departments in 
designing and implementing new policy solutions. They have an international reputation for 
excellence, inspiring new thinking through delivering practical policy projects, building the skills 
and knowledge of the policy profession. Recent projects have explored the private rental sector 
(CLG), digital forensics (Home Office) and digital record keeping (The National Archive).  
6.21 Harnessing the latest technologies offers tremendous opportunities to support and 
accelerate the delivery of government efficiency and transformation programmes. To better 
understand these opportunities, the Government Digital Service (GDS) has recently researched 
the cross-government landscape of technology innovation including the use of emerging 
technologies such as machine learning, blockchain and advanced biometrics in both internal 
government and citizen-facing public services.  
6.22 Some departments have created innovation funds. There are a wide range of such funds 
across government, aimed at tackling challenges ranging from social issues to exploiting new 
technologies.  
6.23 Notable examples of such funds include the following. 
• The Department of Health’s Global Digital Exemplar programme is a £385 million
fund from which digitally advanced hospitals can bid for additional funding to
deliver innovative practices. Digital exemplar hospitals then share their learning and
experiences to enable other trusts adopt successful innovations as quickly and
effectively as possible.
• The Ministry of Defence’s Defence Innovation Initiative helps industry develop
game-changing technologies and encourage greater efficiency in the innovation
process. This initiative encompasses both an £800 million Innovation Fund (from
which industry bids for grants to develop innovative technologies) and a horizon
7 ‘A Government that worked better and cost less’, Christopher Hood & Ruth Dixon, 2015 
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scanning function to inform MoD on emerging technologies which could be 
applicable to its activities. 
• The Department for Education’s Teaching and Leadership Innovation Fund, 
designed to support high-quality professional development for teachers and school 
leaders. The three-year, £75 million fund aims to contribute towards tackling social 
mobility by improving the educational outcomes of children and young people. 
6.24 Such funds are also popular internationally. The UK, USA, Australia and Sweden recently 
launched a joint global innovation fund totalling $200 million. This fund provides grants, loans 
and equity investments to the developing world for social innovations that improve the lives of 
people living on less than $5 a day.8   
6.25 The ‘Race to the Top’ Fund, launched in 2009 by President Obama and his Secretary of 
Education, Arne Duncan, exemplifies the benefits that can be achieved by such funds. The 
programme required US States to compete for a $4 billion federal fund established to drive 
coherent whole system school reform and transform teaching and learning in schools. The 
initiative empowered states to develop reforms that met certain requirements, ranging from the 
introduction of new data systems to turning around poor performing schools. Many states 
changed their legislation in order to enter the competition, thereby delivering worthwhile 
reforms even if they were not ultimately successful in their bids. As a result the benefits of the 
competition extended far beyond the winning States and at no cost to the Federal Government. 
The competition was also run transparently, allowing States to learn from each other during the 
process (further underlining the importance of effective knowledge sharing).9 
Recommendation 
6.26 It is important to note that innovation funds cannot, by themselves, foster disruptive 
innovation within the government. The aspiration should be to make innovation part of the day-
to-day working of government which can only be realised by embedding the necessary 
behavioural and cultural changes. The expectation should be that departments come forward 
with bold ideas about doing more with less without requiring separate innovation funds. 
6.27 The Framework emphasises innovation – both marginal and disruptive – but the Treasury 
can do more to promote innovation. It could demand that disruptive social or technological 
innovations, which radically improve outcomes and dramatically lower costs, are routinely 
presented by departments in business cases and Spending Review submissions. This would have 
the potential to deliver such change. The Treasury should actively pursue this approach in 
dialogue with the Cabinet Office and major spending departments. Ministers and officials from 
the latter should gain recognition for their courage and determination in innovating rather than 
for the size of their budget.        
 
8 available at: https://globalinnovation.fund/who-we-are/about-us/ 
9 ‘Race To The Top’, U.S. Department of Education, 2009 (available at: https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/factsheet.html)  
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7 Next steps 
7.1 The previous three chapters have set out an ambitious agenda to improve UK public sector 
productivity and public value. If successfully implemented, this programme could significantly 
improve performance across central government departments, as well as agencies, local 
authorities, front-line service providers and beyond. However, this will not happen without 
coordinated, collaborative action across the public sector. This chapter sets out the next steps for 
how this work could be advanced.    
Public Value Framework 
7.2 The immediate priorities for the Public Value Framework are threefold. 
• Further testing with departments: as identified in Chapter 5 the Framework should
be further refined and developed through piloting it with departments that have
already volunteered to do so. The purpose of this activity would be to both test the
content, structure and utility of the Framework, and explore the most effective
means of using it to reach judgements. This work should begin before the end of
2017 and continue through the first half of 2018.
• Consultation: this report (and the publication of the Framework with it) will no
doubt generate a rich dialogue with interested parties outside the public sector.
These responses would help further strengthen this thinking.
• Publishing a revised Framework and guidance: the initial pilot phase could
culminate in a revised version of the Framework being published in mid-2018. This
would set out a definitive version of the Framework that can be used across the
public sector. The publication could also provide guidance on how to use the
Framework to reach judgements, including thoughts on methodology and the type
of evidence required to make these effective. The Treasury could also take this
opportunity to provide further clarity on its plans to integrate the Framework into
its own processes.
7.3 As noted in Chapter 5 the Treasury, in dialogue with colleagues across government, should 
look over time to strengthen the incentives relating to Public Value Reviews to ensure they gain 
the traction necessary to improve performance. This is not the moment to lay down a timetable 
on this point but as ever, given the fiscal position, time is of the essence. The Treasury should, 
therefore, move as promptly as possible. 
Innovation and data 
7.4 The recommendations in Chapter 6 are broad and ambitious. The Treasury will need to 
embed attitudes about the availability and use of data across the department to ensure this 
message is consistently communicated to spending departments. Similarly, with marginal gains 
and behavioural insights: if this kind of thinking is to become a clear expectation it will need to 
be consistently communicated to all spending departments. Within both marginal and disruptive 
innovation, the Treasury should explore how it can best support and incentivise this activity 
through the way it manages public expenditure and its relations with departments and agencies. 
It should do so collaboratively with departments to ensure solutions are jointly agreed and 
(where relevant) implemented. 
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A 
The Public Value 
Framework  
Pillar 1 – Pursuing Goals 
Areas to consider Example questions Best case Worst case
1. Understanding goals and indicators – do you have clearly defined goals and indicators?
Understanding of goals Is the overall vision clear?  Have 
clear goals been developed?  Are 
they measurable?  Is there a sound 
understanding of the degree of 
challenge, based on historical 
performance? Is the challenge 
understood in terms of real-world 
outcomes, impact on human capital, 
changing perceptions,  as well as 
meeting the goal?
Vision has been translated into 
challenging, outcome-focused and 
measurable goals that reflect 
underlying real-world 
improvements sought.  
Understanding of degree of change 
required based on historic data 
including impacts of past 
activities/external influences. 
Significant ambiguity/evidence that 
goal and policy are in conflict. Lack 
of appreciation of urgency and 
scale of change required, as 
indicated by lack of evaluation of 
historical performance.
Key performance indicators Have effective Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) been developed to 
track and manage performance?  
How well is the link between KPIs, 
goals and outcomes understood? 
Have measurable and SMART 
objectives been set?
Clear KPIs have been set and are 
being used to track performance.  
Good understanding about how 
the KPIs relate to goals and 
outcomes.
Little evidence of KPIs being used to 
track performance.  Confusion 
about the relationship between KPIs, 
goals and outcomes.
2. Degree of ambition – how ambitious are your goals?
Ambition How ambitious is the goal?  How 
does it compare with global leading 
delivery and outcomes in similar 
sectors?  How are short-term and 
long-term goals being balanced?
Goal is ambitious and compares 
positively with global examples of 
similar policies or programmes.
Goal is not supported by evidence, 
and is wildly ambitious or below 
what similar systems have achieved.
Organisational change Is any major organisational change 
required along the delivery chain to 
achieve delivery (e.g. cultural, 
behavioural, structural)?
Any organisational change is well 
understood and planned for or no 
major organisational change 
required.
Major organisational change 
required with significant barriers to 
success or confusion about how 
changes should work.
Interdependencies and constraints How dependent is this goal on the 
delivery of other programmes and 
support from other public bodies?  
How manageable are these 
interdependencies? Are there any 
constraints that make the target 
particularly difficult to achieve  (e.g. 
timescales, resources, technical, 
political)?
Interdependencies well understood, 
manageable and being managed.  
No constraints or only a few 
constraints that can be worked 
around.
Several major and critical 
interdependencies which are either 
not understood or not addressed.  
Major constraints exist that will be 
difficult to work around.
3. Progress towards indicators and goals – how are you able to track progress against delivering your goals?
Historic performance Is a demanding step change or 
reversal in performance required?  
Has recent performance been on 
track?  How well are the challenges 
involved understood?  Is there a 
good understanding of what is not 
working or is ineffective?
Continuation of trend could achieve 
target or there is clear rationale to 
justify step-change. 
Department/public body has history 
of achieving its targets, and a clear 
understanding of the drivers of 
recent performance.
A major reversal in performance 
trend is needed within short 
timescales with no clear rationale. 
No clear understanding of 
challenges involved in achieving 
implied performance.
Measures (or indicators) Are current proxy measures or lead 
indicators suitable? Will measures 
quickly show whether actions are 
working? 
Measures selected that will enable 
monitoring at frequent enough 
intervals and drive the right 
behaviours. Public and stakeholder 
perceptions are also tracked.
No measures or proxy indicators 
identified, or timelags too great to 
inform delivery, or measures distort 
priorities or drive the wrong 
behaviours.
Trajectories Are there trajectories showing the 
expected outturn at each 
intermediate point between the 
baseline and the target year?  Can 
the data be broken down for 
comparisons (e.g. by unit or 
region)?
Each measure has a trajectory 
clearly linked to key activities and 
milestones and sound progress-
tracking processes.
No trajectories or trajectories not 
based on any analysis.
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Pillar 2 – Managing Inputs 
Areas to consider Example questions Best case Worst case
1. Processes to manage resources – do you have effective financial management processes?
Understanding of
total resources
Does the public body understand 
the quantity of total financial 
resources available and its sources 
of funding? Does it understand the 
risks around that funding?
Public body is aware of financial 
resources available to it and 
produces its spending plans 
accordingly. Income assumptions 
are taut and realistic.
Public body displays no 
understanding of resources 
available to it. Plans are based on 
over-optimistic or untested income 
assumptions.
Financial 
planning
Does the public body have a clear 
plan about how to live within 
financial resources available whilst 
still delivering outcomes? Does it 
have contingency plans in case 
funding pressures emerge or there 
are increases in demand? Is there a 
medium-term financial plan?
Public body has detailed plans 
showing how it intends to meet its 
objectives with its allocated budget. 
Strong reprioritisation and 
contingency mechanisms are in 
place to deal with significant 
unforeseen pressures.
Public body begins the year with 
budgets significantly over-
programmed. Is reliant on receipt of 
additional resources to meet any 
unforeseen pressures.
Financial 
processes
Does the public body have 
processes to regularly review the 
use of resources?  How early is it 
likely to anticipate a budget 
pressure emerging?  Does it have 
effective channels through which 
the emerging pressure can be 
escalated?
Public body systematically reviews 
use of resources and conducts 
evidence based assessment of 
likelihood and scale of risks. 
Assessments are shared with parent 
body/HMT on monthly basis and 
mitigating actions agreed as 
necessary.
No evidence that financial position, 
use of resources and assessments of 
emerging pressures are reviewed or 
escalated. 
Management 
information
Does the public body have a 
process by which relevant, up-to-
date and comprehensible 
management information is 
regularly provided to key decision-
makers?  How effective is the 
quality of the management 
information provided?
Public body has systems in place to 
allow it to produce relevant, timely 
and consistent management 
information, which it shares with 
key decision makers including HMT.
Public body does not gather 
relevant management information 
or does not share information with 
parent department or HMT.
2. Quality of data and forecasts – do you have the requisite data to break down, track and forecast spending over the Spending Review
period?
Spending breakdown Can the public body produce a 
detailed breakdown of spending by 
programme and economic category 
for the whole of the Spending 
Review period? Is this reflected in 
the medium-term financial plan?
Detailed spending plans, covering 
both programme and economic 
category, are in place for the whole 
of the Spending Review period. 
These are loaded onto the Online 
System for Central Accounting and 
Reporting (OSCAR).
Detailed plans setting out how the 
public body intends to deploy its 
resources do not exist.
Tracking spending Is the public body capable of 
tracking how much has been spent 
through the delivery chain, from 
central government to the front 
line? Does the entity record this 
data on OSCAR in-line with best 
practice guidance?  Does the public 
body have a comprehensive 
understanding of the analytical 
evidence base in their area? Does 
this evidence inform economic 
appraisal of delivery options?
Public body produces reliable, 
consistent and timely data on 
amount spent, destination of spend 
and what has been purchased. Data 
shared with parent 
organisation/HMT at regular 
intervals.
Public body is unable to identify 
destination of spend or what has 
been purchased. Any data held is 
not shared with key stakeholders. 
Forecast accuracy Are the public body’s in-year 
spending forecasts accurate to 
within 1% of the outturn figure?  
Did it produce the forecast on time? 
Is there a good understanding of 
the in-year forecast impact on the 
following year?
Detailed forecasts are produced 
each month and are shared with 
parent organisation/HMT. Forecasts 
at mid-year point are within 1% of 
actual outturn. 
Forecasts bear little or no 
resemblance to outturn and are 
updated infrequently.
Evidence of inputs linked to outputs Does the public body have evidence 
linking the purchase of inputs to the 
delivery of outputs?  Are there 
processes in place to use this 
information to inform future 
decisions on the purchase of 
inputs?
Public body is able to produce 
evidence linking expenditure to 
specific outputs. This information is 
used to inform future spending 
decisions. 
No evidence exists to show link 
between expenditure and specific 
outputs. Spending decisions are not 
linked to past performance.
3. Benchmarking and cost control – how are you benchmarking your spending data and using this to control costs?
Front-line and back-office Does the public body understand 
the split of its resources between 
front-line and back-office services?  
How does this compare against 
other similar organisations? Does 
the public body have evidence to 
explain the differences?
Does the public body understand 
the split of its resources between 
front-line and back-office services?  
How does this compare against 
other similar organisations? Does 
the public body have evidence to 
explain the differences?
Public body distinguishes between 
front-line and back-office spending 
and understands how this 
compares with similar organisations. 
Keeps back-office costs under 
review to maximise resources 
devoted to the front-line.
The public body is unable to 
distinguish between front-line and 
back-office functions and does not 
benchmark spending against similar 
organisations. 
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Pillar 2 – Managing Inputs (Continued) 
Unit costs Does the public body have data on 
resources expended per input 
purchased and per unit of output 
delivered?  Does it have data on 
unit costs in functional areas of 
spend (e.g. property or IT)?  Does it 
have processes to use this data to 
improve efficiency performance?
Accurate, timely and consistent 
data on unit costs are produced 
and used at management level to 
inform future spending decisions 
and to drive improved efficiency.
Data on unit costs are not 
produced. No attempt is made to 
use information on unit costs to 
improve efficiency. 
Domestic and international 
comparison
Does the public body undertake 
internal and external (including 
international) comparison of cost 
data (including unit costs)?  Does it 
identify, understand and (where 
appropriate) implement best 
practice?
Reviews of internal and external 
cost data are undertaken at regular 
intervals. The information gathered 
is used to inform changes in 
practices aimed at reducing costs.
Public body conducts no 
comparisons of cost data and 
displays no awareness of best 
practice.
Cost control Are there systems in place to 
monitor and control costs in real-
time?  How quickly does 
information on escalating costs get 
passed to senior decision makers?  
Is the process for doing so well 
understood and reliable?
Costs are monitored in real time. 
Systems are in place to provide this 
information to management at 
regular intervals to inform in-year 
decision making.
No systems are in place to monitor 
and control costs. Spending 
decisions are not informed by unit 
cost information.
4. Cost shifting – do you have a controlled approach to cost shifting?
Source of Funding Does the public body know its 
ultimate source of funding (i.e. 
central funding or charging end 
users)?  Are there alternative 
funding models and, if so, can the 
public body demonstrate its funding 
mix is optimal?
Public body is fully aware of existing 
funding sources. Detailed review of 
all potential funding models has 
been carried out. Public body is able 
to demonstrate that existing 
funding mix is optimal. 
Public body demonstrates poor 
awareness of its funding streams 
and factors that may affect them. 
Hasn’t analysed alternative funding 
modeIs and is unable to 
demonstrate that service is being 
funded optimally.
Reliance on others Is the public body reliant on others 
to provide funding to meet costs?  
Does the public body have a 
strategy to manage this risk?  Is this 
strategy effective?  Are there 
suitable contingency plans?
Public body has identified where it 
is reliant on other bodies for 
funding. Strategy is in place to 
monitor and mitigate risks and 
where risks do materialise to 
manage within existing budgets. 
Public body is heavily reliant on 
funding from external bodies, but 
has no processes in place to 
monitor and mitigate risks to this.
Cost shifting on others If the public body fails to deliver, 
does it shift costs on to other public 
sector entities and end-users?  Does 
the public body understand the 
magnitude of this risk? Are there 
processes to minimise the 
probability of this happening?  Does 
the public body maximise the 
benefits for others, and are there 
incentives to save costs for others?
Public body understands the risks 
posed to other parts of the public 
sector and end-users by delivery 
failure. Systems are in place to 
monitor and mitigate the risks and 
information is shared with 
concerned parties.
Programme failure leads to 
increased costs for other public 
sector entities and end-users. 
Magnitude of this risk is not 
understood and no strategy is in 
place to monitor and mitigate the 
risks.
Temporal cost shifting Is the public body making savings 
through shifting costs to future 
periods (e.g. through deferring 
investment or purchasing lower 
specification inputs)?
Public body does not rely on 
deferring spending to realise 
savings. Where investment is 
deferred this is a result of genuine 
value for money reasons and 
programme delivery is not delayed. 
Savings made are purely the result 
of deferring investment or delaying 
programme implementation. Public 
body has no plan to deal with 
pressures deferred to later years.
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Pillar 3 – Engaging users and citizens 
Areas to consider Example questions Best case Worst case
1. Public and taxpayer legitimacy – do you understand public perceptions of the policy or programme and are you responsive to this?
Understanding 
public / taxpayer  perceptions
How well does the public body
understand what taxpayers think 
about the policy or programme?  
How well does the public body
understand the drivers of taxpayers’ 
perceptions?
Public body deeply understands the 
drivers of public perceptions and 
the fluctuations of public support.  
Public understand the aims and role 
of the programme or service, and 
are satisfied with the quality.
Public bodies are unaware of public 
opinion or do not understand 
reason for public dissatisfaction.  
Public are, or are expected to be, 
hostile to this policy or programme 
or do not understand aims.
Responding to 
public / taxpayer perceptions
How well does the public body
influence public and taxpayer 
perceptions? How is taxpayers’ 
understanding of the policy or 
programme aims being developed, 
and how successful is the strategy?  
How well do key players in the 
delivery chain understand their role 
in improving the understanding and 
perception of taxpayers?
Public body has a track record of 
successful influencing of public and 
taxpayer understanding and 
perceptions. Where the gap is 
challenging, there is a plan for 
improving public perceptions.
No track record of successful 
influencing of public and taxpayer 
understanding or perceptions.  No 
strategy, or strategy is low priority,  
for tackling them in the future.
2. User and client experience and participation – do users and clients have an improved experience and better outcomes due to increased
participation?
Understanding experience How well understood is the 
relationship between the experience 
of users and clients and achieving 
better outcomes?  Does the public 
body understand the drivers of 
improving the experience of users
and clients?  
Relationship between user and 
client experience and better 
outcomes is well understood. 
Drivers of improving user and client 
experience are understood.
No clear understanding of how user
and client experience and better 
outcomes are related, or of how to 
improve user and client experience.
Improving experience How effective is the strategy to 
influence the experience of users
and clients?  How does the public 
body expect its activity to lead to an 
improved experience?  How well 
does the public body understand 
the reasons for demand for its 
services? How will it be able to 
manage increases in demand?  How 
well understood is the cumulative 
impact of different programmes on 
users and clients?
Clear, effective strategy is being 
implemented to influence user and 
client experience with consideration 
given to impact of multiple 
programmes.
No clear strategy to influence user
and client experience. Lack of 
understanding of impact of 
multiple programmes.
Participation in policy action Where relevant, to what extent are 
the public and users engaged with 
the government funded and 
directed policy or programme 
action? How does this compare 
with benchmarks? How well 
understood are the drivers of 
participation levels? Do the public 
and users understand their own 
roles in improving outcomes?
Level of public participation is 
equivalent or better than 
benchmarks. Public body 
understands the drivers and level of 
public participation.
Participation by public is worse than 
benchmarks. Public body unaware 
of participation rates or does not 
understand why it is worse than 
benchmarks.
3. Key stakeholder engagement – are you aware of your key interest or stakeholder groups and do you have a constructive relationship with
them?
Key stakeholder groups Does the public body understand 
who are its key interest or 
stakeholder groups (groups that 
have a strong interest in the 
outcomes of the policy) and what 
they want from the policy or 
programme?  Does the public body 
know how to influence perceptions 
of these groups?  How effective is 
the implementation of the strategy 
in improving the support from key 
interest groups for the policy or 
programme?
Public body has a clear 
understanding of its key stakeholder 
groups and how to influence them. 
Public body has a track record in 
engaging and building support 
from these groups.
Public body unclear of key interest 
groups and of how to influence 
them. Public body has no track
record in building alliances among 
these groups.
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Pillar 4 - Developing System Capacity 
Areas to consider Example questions Best case Worst case
1. Capacity to innovate and learn from innovation - how do innovations drive improved outcomes and reduced costs?
Innovation environment How far does the performance 
culture encourage innovation to 
drive improvements? How are new 
or different ways of doing things 
promoted to reduce costs or 
transform outcomes?  How are 
improvements promoted through 
both ‘marginal gains’ and 
‘disruptive innovation’?
Innovation is promoted to develop 
more effective service delivery and 
reduce costs.  Examples of both 
marginal gains and disruptive 
innovation leading to improved 
outcomes.
Innovation is stifled or not seen as a 
way to improve performance.  Few 
examples of successful innovations. 
Use of technology How is new technology being 
developed and deployed to reduce 
costs and improve outcomes?
Strong evidence of new 
technologies being utilised to 
improve service delivery, reduce 
costs, or improve outcomes.
Few examples of new technologies 
being used.  Developing 
technological solutions not seen as 
a priority within the programme or 
policy.
Changes in behaviours How are changes in the behaviours 
of users or clients being promoted 
to improve the quality of service 
provision or reduce demand?
Behavioural insights and other 
evidence about behavioural 
changes being utilised to analyse 
and review the effectiveness of 
programmes and delivery.
Little evidence of learning about 
changes in behaviours being 
employed.
System learning and what works How is learning from past 
performance and examples of 
effective practice being utilised?  
How swiftly are these learnings 
cascaded throughout the system to 
enable the system to respond?
Responsive, reflective culture in 
which innovation is encouraged, 
learnings are quickly identified and 
systematically rolled out to all parts 
of the delivery chain.
Few attempts to distil best practice.  
Learning, if any, remains at the 
centre. 
2. Capacity to plan and deliver – how do your strategy, plans and systems of accountability lead to improved delivery?
Business strategy Is there clarity about what success 
looks like at milestone points? Have 
the desired outcomes and activities 
been prioritised – where necessary, 
have tough choices been made? Is 
there a clear ‘blueprint’ which 
defines success in terms of:  
changed business processes, people, 
or tools?  How is the business 
strategy linked to the medium-term 
financial plan?
Leaders throughout the delivery 
chain are clear about the priority 
activities and what the benefits of 
the outcomes are.  They refer to 
shared definitions of success which 
are translated into tangible 
outcomes.
Activities are planned without a 
common understanding of what 
they will deliver and/or why those 
outcomes are important. No 
prioritisation of activities. Success is 
not defined, or defined in terms of 
vision statements which are not 
translated into meaningful 
outcomes.
Implementation planning, 
milestones
Has the strategy been turned into a 
rationalised plan? Have the right 
actions been identified to 
implement the strategy? Have 
meaningful milestones been set at 
sufficiently frequent intervals to 
focus progress assessment? How 
robust is the financial plan?
Stretching and credible plan is 
being used that identifies the right 
resources,  activities and milestones.  
Plan is clearly related to business 
strategy, with systematic 
monitoring, and solid financials (no 
use of central reserve, no 
over/underspend).
No plan, or inadequate plan which 
does not identify or is unrealistic 
about required resources and 
activities (e.g. under/overspends 
continuing, drawing down of 
reserves). Infrequently monitored 
and/or insufficiently challenging.
Accountability How far are named people held 
accountable throughout the delivery 
chain and how effective is the 
accountability? What are the 
mechanisms for holding people to 
account? How clear are key 
deliverers’ roles and responsibilities?  
How effective are the senior officials 
in using their powers to make as 
much change as they can? How far 
do they prioritise delivering 
improvements? How far are people 
accountable for outcomes and 
influencing others?
All the key people in the delivery 
chain have clear responsibilities and 
power to make changes. Key 
deliverers see themselves as 
accountable for influencing others 
and for outcomes/progress towards 
targets.
Single named official has nominal 
responsibility (but no ownership), 
with multiple objectives, no 
tradition of power to make changes 
and an expectation of moving on 
quickly. Focus of accountability is 
processes and activities, not 
outcomes.
3. Capacity to engage with the delivery chain – how are you ensuring that delivery chains are understood, influenced and engaged?
Understanding the delivery chain Has the structure of the delivery 
chain been identified? Are roles and 
responsibilities clear? Are the 
interests and influences of key 
stakeholders understood? How does 
the public body understand and 
manage the financial weak points in 
the system? How does the public 
body understand workforce and 
industrial relations issues?
Key people, stakeholders and target 
customers have been mapped and 
cascaded. There is a strategy for 
strengthening the chain (where 
appropriate). Clear methods exist to 
spot and engage financial concerns 
in the delivery chain.
Functions of the delivery chain are 
opaque. Lack of clarity about who 
the main deliverers are.  No 
mechanisms to manage financial 
weak points in the system.
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Pillar 4 – Developing System Capacity (Continued) 
Influencing the delivery chain How much influence do the policy 
or programme owners have with 
the accountable people in the rest 
of the delivery chain? How far do 
leaders engage the chain without 
giving up ‘non-negotiables’? Do 
processes strengthen areas of 
weakness (internally and in the rest 
of the chain)? Do relevant parts of 
the centre provide adequate 
challenge to strengthen 
accountability throughout the 
chain?
Policy or programme owners are 
able to influence key elements in 
the delivery chain, leading to 
change in people, tools, processes 
or culture within their own 
department and the rest of the 
chain. Deliverers throughout chain 
are supported by constructive 
challenge from the centre.
Policy or programme owners have 
no influence, or do not use it, over 
the rest of the delivery chain. 
Tendency to give in on key areas of 
policy or process in order to get 
support. Areas of weakness are left 
unchallenged. Challenge from the 
centre is inadequate or fails to 
strengthen accountability.
Communication & engagement Is there a communications strategy 
and a strategy for staff 
engagement? Are the right 
communications channels being 
used for stakeholder and staff 
communication? Is there a focus on 
staff along the chain understanding 
what they are trying to achieve and 
why?  Is there a mechanism for 
regular feedback on key delivery 
issues? Do staff act as advocates of 
the service? 
Policy or programme owners can 
demonstrate that the right 
communications channels are being 
used. Key people in the chain ‘own’ 
delivery messages and cascade 
clarity on contribution of targets to 
delivery. Department listens to these 
people and acts on feedback.
No clarity on who the key 
stakeholders are.  Conflicting 
messages pervade the delivery chain, 
large sections are not covered by 
the communications strategy.  
Department not receiving, or 
ignoring, feedback.
Service commissioning and 
intervention
How effective are service 
commissioning arrangements? 
What mechanisms exist for de-
commissioning services or activities 
that no longer add value? How 
easily can users exit, or new 
providers replace, poorly 
performing services? 
Services are commissioned 
effectively. Commissioning 
arrangements are responsive to 
performance outcomes and costs.  
Appropriate intervention methods 
exist to address poor performance. 
New providers are encouraged.   
Commissioning arrangements are 
weak, inflexible, or insufficiently 
focussed on costs and outcomes. 
Poor performance is not tackled 
and intervention is limited or too 
late. Users are unable to move from 
failing services.
4. Capacity to work across organisational boundaries – have you forged effective inter-departmental and inter-organisational relationships?
Relationships How do staff model effective 
collaborative working with other 
public bodies?  How are effective 
inter-departmental working 
relationships forged and then 
developed?  Do the policy or 
programme owners promote and 
celebrate examples of effective 
practice?  How effectively do teams 
work across functional boundaries 
within public bodies to achieve 
outcomes?
Staff are viewed as a model of how 
to collaborate with other public 
bodies.  Relationships are fostered 
and developed through effective 
practice. 
Staff are known for collaborating 
ineffectively with other public 
bodies. Few role models of effective 
practice and practice not shared.  
Principles and incentives Do the policy or programme owners 
see the purpose and benefits of 
collaborating with other public 
bodies? Are the benefits clear to 
staff? Are there incentives to 
encourage collaboration?
Policy or programme owners 
understand the purpose of inter-
departmental collaboration and 
ensure staff see this as a preferred 
way of working. Results are 
achieved through collaboration and 
this is celebrated.
Policy or programme owners fail to 
understand what can be gained 
from collaborating with other 
public bodies. Results are sought at 
the expense of others and the 
ability to fight their corner is prized. 
5. Capacity of the workforce – have you invested in developing a workforce strategy, building skills and fostering a positive culture amongst
your staff? 
Workforce strategy Is there an effective workforce 
strategy that is linked to wider 
service delivery goals, identifies 
workforce issues, and defines future 
workforce requirements?  Are data 
and indicators used to monitor 
whether the strategy is being 
implemented successfully?
Clear forward-looking workforce 
strategy, aligned with wider delivery 
objectives, identifies and addresses 
workforce issues, with clear, regular 
metrics for monitoring performance.
No workforce strategy exists, lack of 
fit between wider objectives and 
existing and future workforce, 
existing issues not addressed due to 
lack of information or capability. 
Leadership How much time are leaders 
dedicating to achieving outcomes?  
How far are leaders engaging 
partners and stakeholders?  How far 
are leaders’ personal development 
plans linked to leadership 
assessments? How far are key risks 
(e.g. effective leaders moving on) 
actively managed?
Leaders at all levels set clear 
expectations and own targets and 
delivery plan. Staff know that they 
will be regularly challenged on 
performance. Leaders are 
committed to growing leadership 
capacity in the wider organisation. 
Leaders pay lip-service to delivery 
and lack determination or 
understanding of what is needed. 
Focused on problems not solutions. 
Conflicting agendas at different 
levels, leaders in the delivery chain 
are isolated. 
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Skills and capacity How far do people (in the public 
body) have the necessary skills? Is 
there a clear process for identifying 
skills gaps? How does the public 
body attract and develop 
appropriate procurement, 
commercial, accounting, contract 
management, policy and digital 
transformation skills? How do 
different skills sets work together?
Teams critical to achieving 
outcomes exhibit full range of ‘core’ 
skills. Senior managers take 
immediate action to fill skills gaps.  
Focus on developing contract and 
procurement skills with a shared 
vision of what good looks like.
Teams lack core skills critical to  
outcomes. No process in place for 
assessing skills means that skills 
gaps are not being identified.  No 
evidence that contract 
management or procurement skills 
are sought after and developed.
System capacity development How do public bodies build the 
long-term health and resilience 
(including financial health) of the 
system?  How focussed are they on 
developing the ability to cope with 
and manage change, including 
machinery of government and 
political changes?  How does the 
public body recruit and retain 
talented staff?  How does the public 
body develop the capacity to both 
manage short-term pressures 
(including unexpected pressures 
such as increases in demand for 
services) and develop long-term 
capacity?
The policy owners build system 
capacity at the same time as 
delivering short-term results.  Clear 
resilience strategies enable the 
department to cope with and 
manage future changes. They 
consciously plan to improve the 
well-being of the future system.  
Clear plans to recruit and retain 
talent.
The policy owners show no 
evidence of building long-term 
sustainable capacity.  No planning 
to develop future system capacity or 
well-being of the future system.  
Little evidence of talent 
management.   
6. Capacity to review performance data and evaluate impact – do you have systems in place to gather and evaluate performance data?
Performance data use How appropriate is the content and 
analysis of performance 
information? Is it reviewed 
frequently enough to drive swift 
action?  Is there sufficient data on 
local and regional performance and 
on contribution by category (e.g. 
segmented group)?  How is the 
data disaggregated in other ways to 
drive improvements?
Systems efficient and reviewed 
regularly. Good quality performance 
reports being used by senior 
managers to drive timely action.
Poor quality or no performance 
reporting means problems are not 
identified or tackled urgently. 
No/inadequate analysis of 
local/regional performance.
Feedback speed Where problems arise, how 
promptly is remedial action taken? 
How sufficient and appropriate is 
the support and/or intervention? 
Are there dialogues about 
performance all the way down the 
chain?
Appropriate support or intervention 
at the right time.  Discussions about 
performance take place at many 
tiers of the organisation.
Support or intervention too little, 
too late.  No dialogue follows from 
circulation of performance 
information.
Evaluating actions How appropriate are the 
evaluations undertaken to 
understand whether the actions are 
having the intended effect?  Does 
this happen at all tiers of the 
organisation, including the front-
line?  How are evaluations planned 
from the outset of new 
programmes?
Well designed evaluations providing 
clear assessment of what is working. 
Front-line participates in evaluation. 
Good use of inspection or other 
data.
Little evaluation taking place or 
planned, or conducted only by the 
higher levels in the organisation.
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B Glossary of Terms 
Glossary of terms 
Allocative Efficiency The effectiveness of achieving the agreed 
government objectives. 
Economy How cheaply inputs are purchased. 
Effectiveness The impact outputs have on desired outcomes. 
Cost effectiveness is where resources are used 
in the optimal way to achieve outcomes.  
Efficiency A key feature in the process of turning public 
money into desired outcomes; i.e. to improve 
efficiency is to improve economy and/or 
productivity and/ or effectiveness. 
Funding The financial resource available.1 
Inputs The resources that are purchased using public 
money. 
Outputs The goods or services produced from inputs 
(activities may be substituted where outputs 
are difficult to measure). 
Outcomes The intended impact of spending public 
money, i.e. the objectives sought by 
government. They can be either direct (usually 
measurable and timely – e.g. NHS waiting 
times) or indirect (causality usually difficult to 
determine, and may have a time lag). 
Productivity The productivity of public services is measured 
by comparing growth in total output with 
growth in total inputs used. Productivity will 
increase when more output is being produced 
for each unit of input. 
Public Value The value created when public money is 
translated into outputs and outcomes which 
improve people's lives and economic 
wellbeing.2 
1 Resource can also include relevant legislation/ legislative powers required to implement a policy
2 Developed further in ‘Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government’, Mark H. Moore, 1995
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Technical Efficiency Reducing expenditure while maintaining the 
same quality of output, or improving output 
while expenditure stays constant. 
Value for Money The optimal use of resources to achieve 
intended outcomes. Measured against three 
criteria: Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness. 
Source: These definitions are based on a model produced by the Public Sector Efficiency Group.3 
3 available at: https://quarterly.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/25/improving-public-sector-efficiency-to-deliver-a-smarter-state/ 
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D List of abbreviations 
BEIS Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy 
BPS Better Public Services 
CCS Crown Commercial Service 
CIMA Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
CIPFA Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy 
CPI Centre for Public Impact 
DCLG Department for Communities and Local 
Government 
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs  
DfE Department for Education 
DH Department of Health 
DSC Data Science Campus (ONS) 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
FMR Financial Management Reform 
GDS Government Digital Service 
GES Government Economic Service 
GPU Government Property Unit 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
HO Home Office 
IfG Institute for Government 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
NAO National Audit Office 
OBR Office of Budget Responsibility 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
PAC Public Accounts Committee 
PESA Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 
PMDU Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit 
PSA Public Service Agreement 
PSEG Public Sector Efficiency Group 
SDP Single Departmental Plan 
VFM Value for Money 
WGA Whole of Government Accounts 
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